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Immigration policy as an area of comparative research was not widely delved 
into until the 1990s when domestic and international events such as wars, 
ethnic conflicts, and decolonisation, as well as globalisation, resulted in mass 
movements of people across borders. The literature on immigration policy 
focuses on macro factors such as economic, cultural, and international ones 
that determine the varying restrictiveness of immigration policies of states, 
often with an over-determination of either state or societal influences. Yet 
these factors do not adequately explain why some states have coherent 
policies while others have more mixed policies with conflicting elements 
within.  
 
In this thesis I examine the immigration policies of two dissimilar countries, 
Japan and Singapore. They are dissimilar particularly in terms of ethnic 
composition, population size, and migration history, but both are 
experiencing a similar outcome. Japan is known to have had a coherently 
restrictive immigration policy while Singapore's was coherently open, but 
their respective stances are becoming increasingly incoherent. This thesis 
argues that the coherence of the immigration policy of a state depends 
heavily on the nature of state-society relations. This thesis finds that in the 
late 2000s, both the state-society relations in Japan and Singapore have 
evolved from one where the state has integrated domination over society, 
particularly in the arena of immigration policy, to one where various social 
forces are challenging the state's dominance. This change in state-society 
relations is largely due to the breakdown in the image that the state has the 
sole policymaking discretion and discursive power, and the subsequent 
expansion of social forces’ influences in the arena.  
 
 
Keywords: immigration policy, coherence, Singapore, Japan, state-society 
relations, strong states, integrated domination, dispersed domination, social 
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1.1 Research question and its importance  
In this thesis I address the following question: why do some states have 
coherent immigration policies while others have more incoherent ones? 
Comparative research on immigration policy began almost three decades ago 
but was not given much attention until the 1990s.1 Domestic and 
international events such as wars, ethnic conflicts, and decolonisation, which 
resulted in mass movements of people across borders brought immigration 
policy as a practice to the fore of scholarly interest, as did globalisation. 
There is an inherent paradox in the process of globalisation. As states trade 
and cooperate increasingly with one another, they also find the growing need 
to control more assertively not only what, but who, enters their borders. The 
prophecy that globalisation would lead to a stateless world with open 
borders where people could easily move from one place to another, as 
‘global citizens’ with the importance of the nation-state on the decline, does 
not seem to be coming true any time soon. It can be observed that, at least 
for most developed and high-income countries, official immigration policies 
have been put in place to ensure that the state boundaries are being watched 
over. These are the destinations most attractive to migrants in terms of good 
job opportunities and living standards. 
 
                                                     
1
 Gary P. Freeman, “Comparative Analysis of Immigration Politics: A Retrospective,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 55(2011): 1541-1560. 
2 
 
Immigration policies are not necessarily restrictive by design, though its early 
beginnings were as such. While their immigration policies may not always be 
coherent, these states could be said to have better control over their borders 
than those who do not have specific policies in place. Coherence here is used 
in the sense that all policy fields are tending in the same restrictive or liberal 
direction, with consistent issue framing, concentration of interests, and policy 
targeting that gel together. 
 
The general question of why some states have more restrictive immigration 
policies which decreases the mobility and opportunity for foreigners to 
migrate, while others have more open ones that promote and facilitate the 
movement of people, has been widely addressed in literature. However the 
more focused question of why, within each state, these immigration policies 
at times cohere while at other times contain conflicting elements has not 
been adequately explained by the macro factors focused on in the literature.   
 
A study of immigration policy coherence is important because in recent 
years, immigration has become a hot button issue in many countries, 
particularly the more developed ones, as people seek to migrate there for 
better opportunities or to escape worse off situations in their home 
countries, resulting in social, political, and economic consequences in the 
destination country.2 This trend has been accelerated by the advancements 
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 Why people migrate, what their motives are (i.e. the theories of international migration), 




in technology and transportation that make travel and communication easier 
across the globe. States have found it necessary to pay more attention to 
their immigration policies to mitigate the consequences of uncontrolled 
immigration that often result from non-existent or incoherent immigration 
policies. The coherence of immigration policies also sends signals to potential 
immigrants on whether they should and are able to migrate to one 
destination or the other, with realistic expectations of whether they will be 
welcomed in their new dwelling. In short, “immigration policy is the crucial 
element determining immigration patterns”.3 
 
This thesis focuses on immigration policies in strong states because of their 
autonomy, capacity, and power which are expected to manifest in a coherent 
immigration policy that mirrors the dominant logic of the state, and not on 
weak states which usually do not have specific immigration policies or a 
policy domain for immigration to begin with.4 Given similar issues facing 
advanced societies, such as labour shortage, low birthrates, and ageing 
populations, and the fact that these states have a lot of autonomy in 
policymaking, it is puzzling how their approaches to immigration policies are 
dissimilar. More notably, not only are they moving away from their 
conventional restrictive or open stances, the individual policy fields also no 
                                                     
3
Eytan Meyers, International immigration policy: a theoretical and comparative analysis 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 3. 
4
 Strong and weak states are defined here according to Migdal’s definition (elaborated later 
in Chapter 2.4). For weak states, this could either be a reflection of the fact that they are not 
yet as attractive to immigrants and hence there is no impulse for an immigration policy, or 
they just simply lack the political will and executive power to enact immigration policies, or a 
combination of these factors.  
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longer form a coherent picture, and are instead cross-cutting, with some 
policies becoming more open while others remain restrictive, and vice versa. 
Why has this happened? 
 
1.2 Main argument 
I draw mainly from the immigration policy literature on factors that affect 
coherence and literature on state-society relations to explore this puzzle. An 
important premise in this thesis is that immigration policy is the output of 
states, and belongs to the domain of internationally recognised states. 
Regardless of which actors within the state influence immigration 
policymaking and the degree of that influence, without the state as a 
territorially bounded entity, immigration policy is a moot point.  
 
I argue that the coherence of a state’s immigration policy depends heavily on 
the nature of its state-society relations. As state agencies and societal actors 
rearrange themselves in the arena of immigration policy in the pursuit of 
their goals and interests, the nature of the interactions will determine the 
coherence of the resulting immigration policy. If a dispersed domination 
where different actors hold wildly competing views obtains, the resulting 
policy could be a mixture of restrictive and open components, that is, an 
incoherent policy. If an integrated domination where certain actors coalesce 
and achieve domination more broadly obtains, the resulting policy can be 
described on the whole as either coherently restrictive or open, depending 
on the actors who dominate.   
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Within a strong state, when there is a change in the state autonomy as a 
result of a breakdown in its image as the unitary and legitimate actor with 
the sole policymaking discretion and discursive power, a change in the 
configuration and interaction of relevant actors can be observed. This 
breakdown is instigated by the large disparity between the image that the 
state has got it all together in terms of its immigration policy as a strong 
state, and the perceived reality which is the negative social and economic 
consequences that seem to be beyond the control of the state. I describe the 
explanatory framework in further in Chapter 3.  
 
While there are many factors such as economic, social, political, and 
demographic factors that can explain the variation across states, these 
explanations only help us understand the immigration policy of a state to a 
limited extent. They remain important as a way of understanding the 
structural context of a state and the general trends of its immigration policy. 
Looking into the nature of state-society relations, however, lends a greater 
analytical tool to understand unanticipated changes or stasis in immigration 
policy that the aforementioned factors cannot fully explain. 
 
Although the literature still largely conforms to the view that the state is an 
important actor in determining immigration policy, it leaves much to be 
desired about understanding the ‘anthropology of the state’, or as Joel 
Migdal describes it, the disaggregation of the state into its different parts, 
and a deeper analysis of its power, autonomy, and capability, vis-à-vis other 
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social forces that affect its domination over society.5 It is notable how much 
state-society analyses are lacking in the immigration policy literature, 
especially considering that in many states, immigration policy is not only the 
concern of the state, but also of other interested actors. These interests 
could or could not be in line with the state’s, and furthermore, within the 
state organisation itself, not all parts are necessarily aligned as is often 
assumed. State-society dynamics are perhaps more researched in other fields 
of study, and understandably less so for places where immigration has not 
yet become a phenomenon of a major social transformation. 
 
Using a most different systems approach, I examine the immigration policies 
of states in two case studies, Japan and Singapore (Table 1). These two 
advanced developmental states6 have very different but coherent 
immigration policy stances at the outset. However, in recent years, it can be 
observed that they are moving away from their traditionally restrictive and 
open stances, respectively, and adopting more mixed immigration policies. 
The methodology is elaborated in a later chapter.  
 
                                                     
5
Joel S. Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute 
one another (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16, 100. “Social forces” is used by Migdal as 
an all-encompassing term for organisations (whether formal or informal) that exist in a 
society, and organisations such as states, social classes, and civil society are considered to be 
the “large scale” social forces. In this thesis, I also use ‘state agencies’ and ‘societal actors’ to 
differentiate between the types of social forces, which are terms commonly used in 
literature. For more examples of social forces in society, see: Migdal, State in society, 107. 
6
Here defined as “a state whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and 
capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit 
developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and 
directions of economic growth, or by organising it directly, or a varying combination of both.” 
Adrian Leftwich, “Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental state,” The 
Journal of Development Studies 31 (1994): 401. 
7 
 




Nature of immigration policy 
Open   Restrictive 
Integrated state 
dominance 













1.3 Scope conditions 
The focus of this thesis is immigration policy in the context of strong states 
which presumably have a lot of control over the direction of immigration 
policies, hence following scholars who maintain, against postnationalists, that 
the determination of immigration policies remain largely within the purview 
of the domestic arena, more than being influenced by international bodies.7 
The type of immigration policies I am concerned with here are those 
pertaining to international immigration, which are often managed at the 
state level, more than internal, illegal, or humanitarian migration which 
would require a separate extensive study on their own. However I will use 
them as examples wherever pertinent. The normative issue of whether 
immigration restriction or liberalisation is legitimate or fair to citizens or 
potential immigrants is beyond the scope of this thesis, as I focus on 
explaining the phenomenon of shifting coherence of a state’s immigration 
                                                     
7
See Gary P. Freeman, “The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restriction in 
Liberal States,” in Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the 
United States, ed. Christian Joppke (England: Oxford University Press, 1998): 86-108; Paul 
Statham and Andrew Geddes, "Elites and the ‘organised public’: Who drives British 




policies. Issues of evaluation, such as the effectiveness of the immigration 
policies in controlling the movement of people, are also not delved into 
here.8 
 
1.4 Significance of research  
There are both theoretical and empirical significance to this research. Existing 
explanations and theories cannot sufficiently account for the puzzle, and 
pairing the state-society and immigration policy literatures is a novel and 
fruitful venture because it propels us beyond the common and 
homogeneously treated units of analyses, be they state or society.  
 
The juxtaposition of these two cases also highlights the untenable hypothesis 
of ethnic homogeneity/heterogeneity which is based upon unchanging and 
simplistic, cogent, monolithic assumptions of societies, especially if the ethnic 
composition of those societies have changed little since independence. It also 
challenges the notion that homogeneous or heterogeneous populations are 
predisposed to behave in certain ways and whose governments will adopt 
certain immigration policies accordingly. Domestic ethnic politics and policies 
do matter nonetheless, and these will be put into perspective within the 
state-society dialectic. 
 
Case selection in the immigration literature thus far has been mostly focused 
on western countries, hence lacking in case studies from Asia, let alone 
                                                     
8
See Mathias Czaika and Hein De Haas, “The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies,” 
Population and Development Review 39, no. 3(2013): 487-508. 
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comparative ones. But as Asia becomes more developed and increasingly 
attractive to immigrants, there is a need to fill the empirical and theoretical 
gaps in literature. This thesis presents a case selection of two regional yet 
very dissimilar countries rarely compared in the immigration literature to test 
the theoretical framework.   
 
1.5 Outline of thesis 
To address the question set out in this thesis, I have organised it in the 
following manner. Chapter 2 starts off with a review of the various definitions 
of key terms, and the literatures on immigration policy and state-society 
relations. Chapter 3 provides an elaboration of the theoretical approach and 
methodology, while Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the case studies of Japan and 
Singapore. Chapter 6 concludes with the findings of this thesis and 












2.1 Immigration Policy  
Before delving into immigration policy and the factors that determine its 
nature and coherence, “immigration” as a phenomenon which policy 
attempts to manage should be clearly described. Marc Helbling et al define 
immigration as “the movement of people from one nation state to another 
and thereby take up residence in the destination country”, without specifying 
time spans but excluding commuting and tourism.9 The International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines immigration as “a process by which 
non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement”.10 The 
emphasis is on staying in the receiving state for a period of time, whether 
temporarily or permanently, and this frames the type of movements 
immigration policy is concerned with. The closely-intertwined relationship 
between immigration policy and nation-states is underscored by Alison 
Bashford when she notes that it is almost the first immediate concern of new 
nation-states after their declarations of independence to set up rules that 
keep some people out, and let others in, to exercise their “newfound 
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Marc Helbling, et al., "The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Index: The 
Importance of a Sound Conceptualization," Migration and Citizenship 1, no. 2 (2013): 9. 
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sovereignty over territory and people”.11 In this we also find an expression of 
a function of immigration policies, which I now turn to defining.  
 
Liv Bjerre et al acknowledge that “the term immigration policy has not been 
defined in a rigorous and systematic manner” despite its extensive usage, 
and has been used interchangeably with other terms such as immigration 
law, immigration restriction, and immigration control.12 This is due to the 
overlapping nature of policies that at times makes it hard to delineate the 
different spheres of functions, though this can be saved by considering their 
different logics. Building on previous definitions by other migration scholars 
such as Hammar (1985), Brochmann (1999), Meyers (2000), and Andreas 
(2003), Bjerre et al define immigration policy as the “government’s 
statements of what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, 
decisions or orders) in regards to the selection, admission, settlement and 
deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country”.13 While they try to 
demarcate immigration policy from related fields such as integration and 
citizenship policies because they fulfill different roles with regard to 
immigrants, they admit that it is not always as clear-cut because these fields 
are at times a component of the other.14 
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Alison Bashford, "Immigration restriction: rethinking period and place from settler colonies 
to postcolonial nations," Journal of Global History 9, no. 1 (2014): 26-48. 
12
Liv Bjerre et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Immigration Policies: A Comparative 
Perspective," International Migration Review (2014): 4. 
13
Bjerre et al., “Conceptualising and Measuring Immigration Policies,” 5. 
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Defining a concept well is an integral first step towards a sound 
conceptualisation, which is especially valuable for comparative research.15 
Bjerre et al’s conceptualisation of immigration policy encompasses groups in 
four policy fields: labour migration, family reunification, asylum/refugees, 
and co-ethnicity. Each policy field has two dimensions outlined by Bjerre et 
al: the external dimension, which entails eligibility requirements and 
conditions, and the internal dimension which deals with the security of a 
status and its respective rights and obligations.16 Several other scholars 
conceptualise immigration policy in a similar manner.17 
 
Often immigration policy is studied apart from citizenship policies. One 
possible reason is that the nature of citizenship differs across countries and it 
affects immigrants’ access and claims to citizenship differently.18 I assert that 
citizenship policies should be included insofar as they constitute an integral 
part of the immigration plans of the country, for instance, if the country is 
augmenting its population by actively courting new citizens. Integration 
policies insofar as they inform the profiles of immigrants a state chooses to 
accept, for instance of a certain age, race, gender, or language skill, should be 
taken into account.  
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 Helbling et al., “The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Index.” 
16
 Ibid., 12. 
17
 See Marc R. Rosenblum and Wayne A. Cornelius, “Chapter 11: Dimensions of Immigration 
Policy,” in Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies, ed. Steven J. Gold and 
Stephanie J. Nawyn (Routledge, 2013); Gary P. Freeman and Stuart M. Tendler, “Chapter 14: 
Interest Group Politics and Immigration Policy,” in Routledge International Handbook of 
Migration Studies, ed. Steven J. Gold and Stephanie J. Nawyn (Routledge, 2013). 
18
Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the 
Politics of Belonging (Psychology Press, 2000), 85.  
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2.2 Coherence and Restrictiveness  
Coherence in this thesis is used narrowly, as a way to describe the overall 
nature of the immigration policy of a state, as a sum of its parts. Even though 
the concept of policy coherence is under-theorised and difficult to measure, 
Peter May et al suggest that “in common parlance, coherence implies that 
various policies go together because they share a set of ideas or objectives”19 
and have a ”consistency with which policy intentions are signaled” to policy 
targets and relevant stakeholders.20 If all the individual policy fields are 
restrictive in nature and generally cohere, the immigration policy stance can 
be described as being ‘coherently restrictive’, and if all the individual policy 
fields are open in nature and generally cohere, the immigration stance can be 
described as ‘coherently open’, with these two terms being ideal types.  
 
In order to address the question raised in this thesis, it is imperative to lay 
out how immigration policies can be considered restrictive/closed or 
liberal21/open, and to know when they are changing towards either direction. 
The least complicated method espoused by some scholars is enumerating 
either the planned numbers in the policy output or the actual number of 
immigrants admitted through the various categories in the policy outcome. 
This method can easily be extended to the various dimensions of immigration 
policy that are countable – the categories/types of immigration and the 
                                                     
19
 Peter May et al, “Policy Coherence and Policy Domains,” The Policy Studies Journal 34, no.3 
(2006): 382.  
20
May et al, “Policy Coherence and Policy Domains,” 381. 
21
 The term ‘liberal’ here is included to show what many scholars in the literature are also 
using to describe immigration policies which are welcoming, promoting and facilitating the 
movements of people, and unrestrictive for the most part. 
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number of visas issued, but it becomes tricky when it comes to more 
substantive matters that cannot be easily quantified, such as changes in 
eligibility requirements and rights. These can no doubt be distinguished 
qualitatively, but when it comes to ascertaining the overall restrictiveness or 
openness of the immigration policy, it is less clear how to put the two 
together to make a complete picture.22 
 
According to Meyers, in order to determine the openness or restrictiveness 
of ‘immigration policy’, it is useful dissect it into three dependent variables, 
culminating in a mixture of qualitative and quantitative measures:  
 
(i) The number of immigrants accepted: “liberal policies” indicate a 
decision to accept more immigrants, while “restrictive policies” indicate 
a decision to accept fewer immigrants; 
(ii) Which immigrants to accept: “liberal policies” indicate a greater 
willingness to accept immigrants of dissimilar racial, ethnic, and cultural 
composition, while “restrictive policies” indicate a lesser willingness to 
accept such immigrants, instead favouring immigrants of similar 
composition”; 
(iii) The decision of whether to favour permanent immigration over migrant 
workers.23 
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 For an example of how some scholars have tried to measure the openness and 
restrictiveness of immigration policy against a constructed index, see Ashley S. Timmer and 
Jeffrey G. Williams, "Immigration policy prior to the 1930s: Labor markets, policy 
interactions, and globalization backlash," Population and Development Review (1998): 740.   
23
Eytan Meyers, International immigration policy: a theoretical and comparative analysis 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 11. 
16 
 
Scholars who focus solely on the numerical measure of restrictiveness, that is 
the question of ‘how many’, often miss out on the eligibility measure, which 
is the question of ‘who gets admitted’. Another aspect that is often 
overlooked is the consideration that immigration policies can be either 
comprehensively restrictive or liberal or dispersedly so, and that they cannot 
be easily measured in a scalar index without wiping out their conflicting 
natures that warrant closer scrutiny.  
 
2.3 Explaining Immigration Policy Direction 
Migration scholars have collectively acknowledged that studying what 
explains the coherence and nature of immigration policies is challenging 
because of the complex nature of immigration policy and the myriad forces 
that shape it. Scholars have used various approaches in understanding 
immigration policy and its changes. Some of these approaches focus on a 
single determinant or argue for the dominance of a certain factor, while 
others go for a holistic or taxonomical approach of seeing how different 
factors are at play or interact with each other, with varying levels of 
confidence in their explanatory powers. Additionally, as much as there is a 
strong focus on state-centered explanations for determining immigration 
policy stances, state strength in terms of autonomy and legitimacy has not 
been seriously questioned or analysed under such explanations. This will be 




Economic, cultural, and international factors  
Meyers reviews and critiques what were then ‘current’ theories about racism 
and immigration control policy. It is interesting to note how he pairs these 
two areas at the outset, without a prior explanation. This could be viewed in 
light of Bashford’s critique of immigration restriction literature’s particular 
focus on racist immigration policies of settler states.24 Meyers outlines three 
overarching categories of explanations: theories on economic competition 
between locals and immigrants, on cultural discord between them, and on 
the influence of international relations and multilateral agreements.25 
 
Each category has various strands within them. For economic theories, 
Marxist and non-Marxist/pluralist variants exist, with the former arguing that 
“economic factors and a class-based political process” influence the 
liberalisation of immigration policies as capitalists bring in migrant workers, 
which depresses working wages but increases profits, and where racism is a 
tool to divide the working class.26 The latter variant provides a more level 
playing field with the state as a neutral arena for interest groups and 
economic actors to influence policymaking in either direction.27 The second 
category puts forth cultural differences and national identity as a primary 
determinant of usually restrictive policies, which Meyers heavily criticises.28  
The third category mainly revolves around realist explanations of conflicts 
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Bashford, "Immigration restriction," 47. 
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 Meyers, International immigration policy, 5. 
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 Characterizations: settler versus ethnic states, homogeneous versus heterogeneous states, 
jus sanguinis versus jus soli states. See Eytan Meyers, International immigration policy, 7. 
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among states that tend to limit immigration and neoliberal institutionalist 
approaches of international cooperation that tend to promote immigration.29 
Meyers acknowledges that these different explanations have their empirical 
merits but fail to account for a variety of situations, and highlights that the 
“greatest weakness of most literature on immigration control policy is that it 
does not relate to any theoretical approach”, with many studies focusing on 
single country studies when more comparative research is needed.30 
 
An arguably major gap in his work is the lack of mention of domestic politics 
(or the lumping of them all into ‘social conflict and industrial unrest’), 
particularly societal actors and their interactions with the state, which cannot 
be downplayed since the factors he mentioned are not objective 
manifestations in and of themselves. They often come to prominence or 
become apparent factors to consider when taken up by different actors, and 
some factors are by their natures more prone to appropriation or 
manipulation than others.  
 
Similarly, Marc Rosenblum and Wayne Cornelius categorise immigration 
policy disputes into three dimensions: economic, cultural, and international 
factors. They argue that economic factors have limited powers in explaining 
the restrictiveness of immigration policy because “although the overall 
economic effects of immigration are modest, they are concentrated in 
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particular sectors and regions, where the economic benefits of migration may 
be significant for employers and the adjustment costs relatively severe for 
some workers”.31 Cultural factors, according to them, center around national 
identity and questions of assimilation and integration, especially of 
immigrants from dissimilar backgrounds. These are strong arguments for 
coherently restrictive policies, though they paradoxically perpetuate 
integration problems and conflicts as long as the immigration policies of 
states remain exclusionist.32 International factors mainly encompass host-
state national security considerations and diplomatic relations, and “more 
likely to be driven by episodic shocks”, making them less predictable than 
economic and cultural factors.33 
 
Their categorisation seems to be somewhat similar to what Meyers put forth 
a few years earlier. This is significant to note because while it shows the main 
determinants of immigration policy more or less center around these three 
major factors, it also reveals a clear gap for other explanations to fill.  
 
Commenting on the political science literature on immigration, Colleen Henry 
notes aptly that economic theory (in terms of class conflict, economic 
recessions, for instance), and not political or cultural factors, is often used by 
political theorists to explain the direction of immigration policy in receiving 
industrialised or liberal nation-states, citing scholars such as Hollifield and 
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Rosenblum and Cornelius, “Dimensions of Immigration Policy,” 248. 
32
 Ibid., 250. 
33
 Ibid., 251. 
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Meyers.34 This theory, while widely used because of its predictive accuracy 
with regard to short term and reactionary changes in terms of direction, 
sidelines the role of the state in determining immigration policy as well as 
societal groups which provide a greater depth in understanding the 
particularities of those changes (or non-changes). Gary Freeman affirms there 
is no doubt that pure economic considerations will not recede into the 
background of immigration politics, but immigration is more than just an 
economic phenomenon, “it is as base a political process”.35 The kinds of 
processes which ensue are then a legitimate question for investigation.  
 
Public Opinion  
Scholars who are less convinced about the efficacy of economic explanations, 
and immigration policy being strictly result of economic rational decision 
making advance other explanations. One of the strong strands, especially in 
the context of liberal democratic nation-states, is public opinion and 
attitudes towards immigration. Opinions can be made up of economic or 
noneconomic concerns, or both.  For instance, Giovanni Facchini and Anna 
Maria Mayda advocate for a political economy framework where public 
opinion shaped by both economic and noneconomic concerns largely 
explains the limited flows.36 However, they also note that given the large 
magnitude of public opposition to immigration, it is puzzling that substantial 
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Colleen Henry, "The political science of immigration policies," Journal of Human Behavior in 
the Social Environment 19, no. 6 (2009): 692. 
35
 Gary P. Freeman, “Comparative Analysis of Immigration Politics: A Retrospective,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 55(2011): 1554. 
36
Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, "From individual attitudes towards migrants to 
migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidence," Economic Policy 23, no. 56 (2008): 695. 
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migration flows still takes place in some countries. They attribute this to the 
phenomenon of pressure groups or lobbies who seem to moderate the effect 
of public opinion on policymaking.37 Later they argue that this “public opinion 
gap” which they rigorously and quantitatively assessed is “a gap between 
very restrictionist public opinion on one side and more open stated policy 
goals on the other”, underlining that there is more that matters than the 
well-studied aggregation of individuals in explaining immigration policy; little 
attention has been paid to government preferences and institutional 
structures.38 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus and inconclusive findings on attitudes 
individuals hold towards immigration and the reasons for them, there has 
been increased skepticism about the explanatory power of public opinion and 
attitudes in determining immigration policy. Other than missing out on the 
presence of pressure groups, the assumption that public opinion would 
translate closely to immigration policy might be hard to hold up unless liberal 
democracies use referenda like Switzerland on immigration policy issues 
where public attitudes are directly reflected in the policy outputs.39 Public 
opinion as a causal variable has also increasingly been disputed due to its 
broadness and indiscrete effects which do not translate neatly onto typically 
complex and multidimensional government immigration policies.40 
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Race, ethnicity, and multiculturalism 
While prior explanations were less focused on the role of the state, the 
following arguments focus on the centrality of the state, in either its own 
construction or preservation at different levels. This also involves skirmishing 
with external currents that undermine the power of the state over its 
territory, such as globalisation effects. 
 
In the immigration literature, there has been a special focus on racist 
immigration policies of what were called ‘settler societies’ or ‘new world 
nation-states’, such as Australia and the United States which were among the 
first nation-states to restrict immigration through official acts. David Scott 
Fitzgerald and David Cook-Martin observe that liberal democracies were the 
first to promulgate racist policies and also among the most passive in 
removing them.41 They note how “the interwar period was a time of 
nationalist retrenchment when exclusions of particular groups of foreigners 
were justified by the perceived imperative of forging internal 
homogeneity”42, illustrating how the American state uses  the method of 
‘othering’ in order to consolidate internally, despite existing differences such 
as domestic discrimination and inequalities. For America, in the years after 
the Civil War where the trend of earlier mass immigrations had to be 
tempered and the state was also eager to preserve its ‘race’ due to nativist 
ideologies and eugenicist principles held by political elites, immigration acts 
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were a way to keep the ‘inferior races’, the non-whites (whiteness being an 
arbitrary category and a social construct), and people with undesirable 
characteristics out by allowing entry and naturalisation only to certain groups 
from select parts of Europe.43 
 
The preservation of a ‘race’, or some sort of homogeneity and particular 
characteristics, also stems from the much propagated idea of a nation-state 
and what it should look like. Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin note that “in many 
countries, ethnic homogeneity, defined in terms of common language, 
culture, traditions and history, has been seen as the basis of the nation-
state”, citing Castles and Miller who argue that “this unity has often been 
fictitious – a construction of the ruling elite – but has provided powerful 
national myths”.44 Others have argued that shared cultural heritage and 
norms have enabled strong states in Europe to be built and that may have 
contributed to the proliferation of this particular idea of the nation-state.45 
Immigration, if unrestricted in some way, is assumed to bring in people of 
different ethnic backgrounds, customs and values, where the consequence 
would be an ethnically diverse society which is perceived to be destabilising 
to the nation-state. 
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As a result of the increasing diversity of immigration and the taboo of racial 
exclusions as well as futile efforts to control immigration while the need for 
immigrant labour rises, some countries had started to embrace an official 
policy of multiculturalism, at first notably in places like Australia, Britain and 
Canada, and later reluctantly in France and Germany. The idea that countries 
should be welcoming of immigrants from all ethnic backgrounds then 
culminated in different manifestations of a more open policy. 
Notwithstanding their varying successes in embracing multiculturalism, the 
terms multicultural, multiracial, multiethnic have been used in a way that 
creates confusion to their real meanings and hence the practices, with many 
only paying lip service.46 Some claim that multiculturalism has been a failure, 
by not fulfilling its intended function in integrating immigrants in all aspects, 
and with the rise of radical right-wing parties in Europe and calls for a return 
to earlier ideas of nationhood which restricted immigration.47 Apart from 
Canada which has included multiculturalism as part of its constitution, 
multiculturalism as an approach to explaining immigration policy direction is 
limited due to the truncated understandings and consequent practice in 
states. 
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Role of Actors  
The factors covered thus far play a significant role in determining whether 
the nature of a state’s immigration policies become more restrictive or open, 
altering their coherence. However, there is a need to discern between 
objective contestation and perceptive contestation, as well as to recognise 
the varying subjectivities of the factors that allow for manipulation. Even 
though there can be different factors at play, how people who have a stake 
or are involved in the policymaking process perceive those factors and the 
environment, and what they choose to push forth matter a great deal. 
Freeman highlights 3 schools of thought on the role of actors in shaping 
immigration policy: statist, institutionalist, and interest group models. He 
argues that each of them lacks theoretical explanations for the actions taken, 
the motivations and preferences (of states or individuals) behind them, even 
if they are empirically grounded.  The statist explanation underscores the 
under-theorised central role of the state in affecting and managing migration 
flows, but fails to show how national interest, however construed, is 
translated to certain kinds of immigration policy.48 Institutionalist accounts 
focus on the disaggregated parts of the state, on institutions like 
bureaucracies, political parties but the interaction between these institutions 
and how it affects immigration policy outputs has not been theorised well.49 
The interest group model is concerned with collective action of non-state 
groups such as labour unions and employer federations, but lack theoretical 
explanations as to why they hold certain issue positions and organise, beyond 
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the seemingly obvious group labels.50 While Freeman cautions scholars 
against methodological nationalism and taking for granted the nation-state as 
a unitary actor to be analysed, what is missing in his critique is the fact that 
the various actors highlighted are construed as neat groups without much 
interaction with each other, and the societal actors who are not formally 
organised are overlooked.51 
 
Paul Statham and Andrew Geddes find little evidence in the case of Britain for 
Freeman’s earlier but related argument that the organised public or interest 
groups, by virtue of better coordination and resources, shape liberal policy 
outcomes more than the unsystematic anti-immigration sentiments of the 
masses do.52 Instead, they find that political elites, who are usually for 
restrictive policies, determine immigration policy to a large extent without 
considering much input from civil society groups.53 They find the ‘objectivity’ 
of the motivation behind interest group collective action, which are based on 
weighing the costs and benefits of immigration, questionable from social 
constructivist and ideological points of view.54 They argue that understanding 
collective action has to take into account how immigration is “politicized and 
publicly mediated” and how some versions of reality seem “more feasible, 
reasonable, and legitimate” than others, as well as who is shaping the 
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opportunity structures (in their case it is the political elites through 
institutions and discourses).55 
 
A key pillar of their argument is the fact that they deem political elites to 
“have considerable autonomy in their actions over immigration”.56 This is 
shown in “their dominance over the political environment and the 
opportunities and incentives it produces which decisively shapes the level 
and contents of pro-migrant and anti-migrant collective action”.57 This begs 
the question of the source of this autonomy, which was not adequately 
addressed. I concur that the autonomy of the state and its agencies plays an 
important role in determining the nature of immigration policy, and that of 
particular interest is the source of that autonomy and how it is linked to 
immigration policy coherence. Strong states undoubtedly have more 
autonomy than weak states, and their immigration policies are inclined to be 
subjected more to the interests of the state and its agencies rather than the 
organised public, though the interests of the two are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In this regard, looking to Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach is 
useful because these elements are treated in his study of the state and 
society. 
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2.4 State-Society Relations 
The literature thus far has portrayed the continuing divide between state-
centered and society-centered approaches in terms of explaining immigration 
policy direction. While each approach has its merits, it is often the case that 
using either approach on its own yields incomplete pictures of immigration 
policymaking with complex outputs and the different pull and push of forces 
of varying magnitudes. Scholars either downplay or overstate the role of the 
state vis-à-vis other immigration policy actors, or place strong emphases on 
the role of organised groups without considering other actors that shape the 
playing field. Furthermore, within each category of actors, there are 
competing constituents which advocate for varying restrictions and 
liberalisations of immigration policy, and these preferences are also 
subjected to change.  
 
To fully grasp the nature of state-society relations in a particular state, 
understanding the power dynamics at play is crucial. The configuration of 
state-society relations in a strong state is necessarily different from that in a 
weak state. Beginning with Migdal, state capabilities or autonomy is 
something not to be taken for granted and his approach centers upon 
understanding the distribution of social control which is “the actual ability to 
make the operative rules of the game for people in the society”.58 Migdal 
begins with the premise that there will always be an environment of conflict 
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between the state leaders and other social organisations.59 A strong state is 
one with a “tremendous concentration of social control”, which can only 
emerge when there exist exogenous factors which “rapidly and deeply 
undermine existing strategies of survival, the bases of social control”.60 
Consequently, a weak state is one in which the distribution of social control is 
not concentrated within the state and its agencies, but very much scattered 
among other social organisations. Migdal argues that strong states are 
uncommon, not least because the severe undermining of existing forms of 
social control does not necessarily guarantee that there is already a solid plan 
in place to enact a new concentration of social control.  
 
His empirical observation of strong states61 yielded a few necessary and 
subsequent sufficient conditions for the creation or emergence of strong 
states. The necessary conditions encompass “massive social dislocation which 
severely weakens social control” and they are war, revolutions, and massive 
migration, and often in combination.62 The sufficient conditions which need 
to follow the huge breakdown in social control are: “world historical 
moment[s] in which exogenous political control forces favour concentrated 
political control”, “the existence of a serious military threat from outside or 
from other communal groups in the country”, “existence of a social grouping 
with people sufficiently independent of existing bases of social control and 
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skillful enough to execute the grand designs of state leaders” (an 
independent bureaucracy where bureaucrats hold beliefs that echo 
autonomous state interests, whatever they may be), and “skillful 
leadership…to take advantage of the conditions to build a strong state”.63 
 
Migdal’s state-in-society approach is useful for this study because the focus is 
on the process, “the ongoing struggles among shifting coalitions over the 
rules for daily behaviour” which in this case are over the rules of who can 
enter and stay in a state.64 Explaining state policies goes beyond the apparent 
factors such as their designs, officials in-charge, or availability of resources. It 
also requires understanding that “states must contend with opposing 
groupings, some of which are quietly and indirectly subversive…, others of 
which are openly confrontational,” and that these groupings can come 
together and consolidate their positions, challenging the configuration of the 
state itself.65 In this sense, the state is not the only actor which matters, and 
neither is it monolithic nor unchanging in its goals and actions. The same can 
be said about societal actors, though the state presumably has a more 
concrete character as an internationally recognised entity with a certain 
“bulk”, as Migdal observes.  
 
Neither the state and its agencies nor other social forces have an inherent 
monopoly over determining the rules of daily life or economic and political 
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agenda, or what Migdal calls “patterns of domination” in these contested 
arenas. He defines domination as “the ability to gain obedience through the 
power of command” which is beyond “coercion or voluntary compliance that 
comes when one sees the rulemaker as the legitimate authority” and is 
something that “can be localized or be exercised broadly over society”.66 
These patterns can be discerned by studying the “cumulation of struggles and 
accommodations in society’s multiple arenas” and we can only do so by 
“conceptually breaking down states and societies and the junctures between 
them”.67 Migdal distinguishes between two patterns of domination:  
 
In some cases, the results of numerous struggles may move a society 
towards integrated domination, which the state or other social forces 
establish their power broadly. In other instances, the conflicts and 
complicities in the multiple arenas may lead to dispersed domination, where 
neither the state nor any other social force manages to achieve countrywide 
domination and where parts of the state may be pulled in very different 
directions.68 
 
With regard to viewing struggles for domination in society as an approach to 
understanding social transformation, Migdal highlights that such struggles 
are not only about the big things, such as “the question of who controls the 
top leadership positions of the state”, or only about big actors such as “entire 
states, social classes, civil society, and the like”, but that such struggles “take 
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place in multiple arenas in which the parts of the state are related not only to 
one another but each is a single social force in a field of interacting, at times 
conflicting, social forces”.69 Despite this declaration, few have applied or 
adapted the more elaborate parts of his state-in-society approach to studies 
other than big events like wars and revolutions.  
 
Scholars have disaggregated states and societies to examine how they 
interact and to demonstrate that these entities are not monolithic. Here I 
propose to go further with Migdal’s approach. He has suggested in which 
areas of research this approach would be useful, such as a governmental 
policy, but has also not applied the state-in-society approach specifically to 
the topic of immigration policy restrictiveness. Further, few scholars have 
applied the more nuanced parts of Migdal's approach, such as the patterns of 
domination, and at this point, none has used them to explain immigration 
policy approaches specifically. It is this theoretical gap which I aim to fill by 
adapting Migdal's approach to a study of immigration policy coherence. I 
view the movement away from a conventional and coherent stance on 
immigration policy as a phenomenon of social transformation on a smaller 
scale. Thus, Migdal’s approach is relevant.  
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Chapter 3  




3.1 The theory  
A strong state, such as a developmental state, has a high level of state 
autonomy, which is the capacity of the state to formulate and implement 
policies without having to yield to pressures from various groups and 
individuals in society.70 A strong state also has monopoly over material and 
symbolic resources, as well as the rules of the game in society. Migdal 
proposes that “actual states are shaped by two elements, image and 
practices”, which can be complementary or contradictory.71 The image of the 
state as a “dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls, in a given 
territory, all rule making” is fairly standard across states, internally and 
externally, and it is in the practices that determine whether this perception 
can be maintained or weakened.72 Practices can encompass many things, and 
Migdal frames it as the “routine performance of state actors and agencies” - 
their actions.73 For instance, a strong emphasis on immigration policy in 
border control is a practice that bolsters the image of the state as being the 
capable gatekeeper which can protect its territory from intrusions.  
 
                                                     
70
The source of this autonomy varies, but for a developmental state, often it is derived from 
the dominance of a single political party, and it is legitimised by successful economic 
development and growth. See Matthew McCartney, Economic Growth and Development: A 
Comparative Introduction, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 74. 
71
Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute 
one another (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16. 
72





A strong state, I put forth, has often mutually reinforcing and complementary 
image and practices. In a strong state there is an integrated domination by 
the state over society, where the state “is at the center or the process of 
creating and maintaining social control".74 This is opposed to dispersed 
domination in a society where the state does not have countrywide 
domination, as a result of either societal actors challenging or working 
outside the rules of the state, or parts of the state are being pulled in 
different directions over multiple environments of action, or both.    
 
Patterns of domination are not fixed and can change. In society, there are 
multiple arenas in which parts of the state and social forces interact with one 
another, where there is domination and opposition, struggles and 
accommodations in each arena, not only over public policy, but also “over 
the basic moral order and the very structure within which the rights and the 
wrongs of every social behavior should be determined”.75 Such interactions 
are never equal since social forces have “unequal abilities and access to 
resources”.76 An arena is a “conceptual locus” where such contestations take 
place and it is “not necessarily spatially limited” or always in conflict as “some 
arenas of domination and opposition have achieved periods of stable 
relations among their social forces in different times and places”.77 The 
relations between social forces are also cross-cutting in that “there is rarely a 
neat division of the population or of issues that keep social forces out of one 
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another’s way”; sometimes they clash, and sometimes they coalesce.78 
Examples of social forces other than state institutions are informal 
organisations, formal organisations such as businesses and churches, and 
social movements which do not necessarily come under any organisation. 
Migdal outlines three dimensions along which a social force’s domination can 
be extended:  
 
First, within an arena, a social force can dominate in an increasing number 
of issue areas… Second, arenas themselves can grow to incorporate a larger 
share of the population and a larger territory... And, third, a social force can 
use the resources it garners in any one arena to dominate in other arenas 
composed of different sets of social forces.79 
 
I posit that when there is a breakdown in the state’s image as the unitary and 
legitimate actor with sole policymaking discretion and discursive power, and 
a change in the configuration and interaction of relevant actors which 
ensues, a decline in the state’s autonomy results. Societal actors increasingly 
realise that the rules of the game set by the state need not be adhered to, or 
that they should not be the only ones allowed to exist. The breakdown is 
caused by the stark disparity that emerges between the image as a state in 
control and the practice of a state unable to control conditions in reality such 
as social and economic consequences of immigration policy. As state agencies 
and societal actors rearrange themselves and change their strategies, the 
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nature of the interactions will affect the coherence of the resulting 
immigration policy.80 Outcomes in an arena can be categorised into three 
ideal types:  
 
(1) total transformation, where the state achieves domination by destroying 
other social forces and imposes its rules,  
(2) state incorporation of existing social forces, through state appropriation 
of these forces and their symbols, which also causes the state parts to 
change and accommodate, altering its overall coherence, and 
(3) social forces’ incorporation of the state, where they appropriate the 
“organization and symbols of the state’s components”, resulting in 
unintended outcomes of the state’s goals in that arena.81 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the situations in the case studies approach the 
second ideal type, where the state’s overall coherence is affected.  
 
3.2 Immigration policy as one of multiple arenas  
To put Migdal’s theory to the test and expand its scope, I posit immigration 
policy as one of the multiple arenas in society in which struggles of 
domination and accommodation occur. Further, within this arena, I define 
sub-arenas to represent the different categories within the immigration 
policy domain. I argue that the coherence of a state’s immigration policy 
depends heavily on whether the state is suffering from any type of image 
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crisis that is weakening its integrated domination over society wherein other 
social forces, such as civil society organisations, unions, businesses or even 
social movements, then take the opportunity to expand their influence or 
diminish the state’s domination in the contested arena. If these societal 
actors can expand their influence in a way that the reclining state has to 
change its goals to accommodate to them, then the resulting immigration 
policy will contain elements that may be very disparate and alter its initial 
coherence, whether it was restrictively or openly so.  
 
I begin with showing that there is integrated domination at the start in both 
cases as strong states, particularly state domination in the arena of 
immigration policy. This is evident in the coherent direction of immigration 
policies, which reflects the preferences of a conglomeration of state 
organisations, and the interaction (or lack thereof) with other actors in the 
field.  
 
When there is a noticeable shift in immigration policies away from their 
conventionally coherent stances, I argue that this shift can be explained by 
first, a breakdown in the image of the state as the sole rulemaker, which 
leads to second, a change in the nature of state-society interactions on this 
matter as social forces in various forms expand their influence through 
various ways. Losing some ground in an arena does not necessarily mean that 
the state is demoted to a dispersed domination across society, but I suggest 
that this is but a step away from integrated domination. This change in the 
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nature of state-society interactions will not result in a determined type of 
outcome, but the outcome will depend on the strategies of both the state 
parts and societal actors.  
 
If the other social forces get ‘incorporated’ by the state which is forced by 
prevailing circumstances to consider them seriously and change or 
accommodate, they will find that their preferences for immigration policy 
would be represented, or at least affect the state’s determination of its 
immigration policy and its overall coherence. In the case where the societal 
actors are pulling in different directions in the arena, and so are parts of the 
state on specific immigration policies, that is, a dispersed domination, we will 
find that there is no one main direction for immigration policies, where some 
policies become more restrictive and while others become more open 
simultaneously. In effect, a mixed or complex policy regime is obtained. This 
is opposed to an overall restrictive or open immigration stance under an 
integrated domination, where the state “can successfully convey a coherent 
system of meaning”.82 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Here I adopt Bjerre et al’s definition of immigration policy.83 The four fields 
covered by their definition are labour/economic migration, family migration, 
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humanitarian migration, and co-ethnicity.84 However for the purposes of this 
thesis, I exclude comparing policies on humanitarian migration (such as 
asylum and refugees) because the politics and logics can be argued to be 
quite different from the other fields and hence would warrant a separate 
discussion.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, coherence here is taken to mean the 
overall nature of the immigration policy area, whether there is consistent 
issue framing, concentration of interests in society, and specific policy 
targeting in terms of who will be affected by the policy.85 Hence it is not 
necessary in this conceptualisation to deliberate on how to ‘add up’ policies 
of differing degrees of restrictiveness and openness and to have the specific 
tools and data to do so. However, there is still a need to define and 
standardise when a policy is becoming more restrictive or open to ascertain 
whether the overall coherence has been altered.   
 
Restrictiveness can be noted at two levels, one at the general level, and the 
other at the level of individual policies. It can also be both qualitatively and 
quantitatively ascertained. An immigration policy becomes more restrictive 
when it decreases the mobility of and opportunity for foreigners to migrate, 
and the reverse is true - an immigration policy becomes more open when it 
promotes and facilitates the movement of people.  At the general level, an 
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increase in restrictiveness means that the range of migrant categories to be 
allowed into the state could be reduced to only certain types of occupations 
or residency, or the total number of immigrants to be allowed in a given year 
goes down. At the level of individual policy, an increase in restrictiveness 
means the eligibility requirements and conditions become stricter, and the 
security of status and rights of immigrants are curtailed. Here it needs to be 
qualified that there is no absolute standard against which all immigration 
policies can be measured in terms of restrictiveness, but as the literature 
review shows, there are some common grounds of immigration policy that 




The research strategy I employ is a small n case study approach. This 
structured and focused comparison method is chosen because it allows a 
detailed examination into a small number of examples to see if the theory 
put forth can explain the process which leads to the outcome that we are 
interested in. This comparative research is across case and time as well, to 
see how state-society dynamics have changed, and is undertaken to 
contribute to theory development and empirical richness in the immigration 
policy literature. 
 
I select two cases for study, Japan and Singapore, using (1) a “before” case 
and an “after” case from a single longitudinal case, or the within-case 
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method, which is the strongest version of a most-similar case design86,  
suitable for the purposes of examining how a state can have coherent 
immigration policies at one point and a mixed one at another with many 
factors controlled for, and (2) the most dissimilar systems design which is 
suitable for the purpose of showing how two diametrically opposing states in 
terms of ethnic composition, history of migration, population size, and 
geopolitical position, among others, undergo a similar process in terms of 
immigration policy shifts. A most dissimilar design is a comparative design 
which is analogous to John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement, where two 
cases “are similar in two essential respects – the causal variable of interest 
and the outcome” where an inference could be made that the former 
contributes to the latter.87 
 
The Ethnic Hypothesis  
An argument can be made that despite facing similar problems of advanced 
societies such as an ageing population and shrinking workforce as well as an 
economic digression albeit at different rates, Singapore’s and Japan’s 
differing immigration policy stances can be explained by their diametrically 
composed societies. Singapore adopts an open-door approach to foreigners 
and migrants, whereas Japan has an official closed-door policy. Singapore is 
ethnically heterogeneous, with 74.3% Chinese, 13.3% Malays, 9.1% Indians, 
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3.3% Others (essentialised official racial groupings which obscure the 
diversity within them)88 as well as official policies of multiracialism and 
multiculturalism, whereas Japan is often described as ethnically 
homogeneous, with 98.5% of the population being Japanese, 0.5% Koreans, 
0.4% Chinese, and 0.6% Others, as well as a dominant understanding of what 
constitutes a Japanese person and Japanese culture.89 
 
The ‘ethnic hypothesis’ would put forth that the more ethnically 
homogeneous a state is, the more restrictive is its immigration policy, and the 
converse applies as well. Various theories and explanations such as those 
covered in the previous chapter espouse this ‘ethnic hypothesis’, such as 
maintaining the cultural singularity or plurality of the society, as well as the 
entrenchment of different levels of tolerance towards diversity. 
 
The ‘Convergence’ 
While the ethnic hypothesis is helpful in explaining divergent cases like 
Singapore and Japan to some extent, what it cannot explain is when such 
cases begin to experience a similar situation, where their immigration policies 
start to lose their coherence and begin to move away from the opposite ends 
of the spectrum that the ethnic hypothesis fixes them in towards the centre 
(as illustrated in Table 1 in Chapter 1), albeit at different speeds and in 
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different ways. Furthermore, their respective ethnic compositions have not 
changed much over the years. What then accounts for loss in coherence of 
immigration policies of these two very dissimilar cases, with the net result of 
moving away from their conventional stances? 
 
For a long time the Japanese government never spoke openly of an 
immigration policy because the general sentiment was that Japan must 
maintain the ‘cultural purity’ embedded within its relatively homogenous 
population and so immigrants are not to be welcomed.90 This homogenous 
mentality was largely moulded and propagated by elites, especially after 
World War II when a defeated Japan was picking itself up, morally and 
physically.91 Hence for a long time up till the late-2000s, Japan had 
maintained a closed attitude towards foreigners, except in dire instances 
when it really needed them, and even then it tried to stick to the idea of 
being ‘Japanese’, such as in the case of the Nikkeijins.92 This restrictive stance 
is reflected in the steady low rates of foreign residents over a long period of 
time (Table 2), and the consistent small percentages of foreigners in the 
Japanese workforce (Table 3), amidst an ageing and declining population 
(Tables 4 and 5). 
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Table 2 Percentage of foreign population in Japan 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
% 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Source: Table 2-14 Stock of foreign population (updated 29 May 2015), The Japan Institute 
for Labour Policy and Training, and 2-14 Foreign National Residents by Nationality (2000-14), 




Table 3 Foreign labour force in Japan 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(‘000) 516 723 650 686 682 718 788 
% 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 NA94 
Source: Table 2-16 Stock of foreign labour force (updated 29 May 2015), The Japan Institute 




Table 4 Ageing population in Japan 
Ratio of aged population Ratio of dependent population 
2005 2010 2012 2005 2010 2012 
30.5 36.1 38.4 51.4 56.8 59.0 





Table 5 Declining population in Japan (1980-2014) 
 Population 
(1,000) 
Population change  
(1,000) 
Year Total Total Natural 
change  
Rate of population change 
(per 1,000 pop.) 
1980 117,060 906 894 7.8 
1990 123,611 406 417 3.3 
2000 126,926 259 226 2.0 
2005 127,768 -19 9 -0.1 
2010 128,057 26 -105 0.2 
2011 127,799 -259 -180 -2.0 
2012 127,515 -284 -205 -2.2 
2013 127,298 -217 -232 -1.7 
2014 127,083 -215 -251 -1.7 
Source:  2-1 Total Population (1920-2014), Statistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Some discrepancies may occur due to the 
usage of Census data in 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010 in the official tabulation.
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Singapore, on the other hand, had many immigrants who came from other 
Asian countries, such as China, Indonesian, Malaysia, Philippines, and South 
Asia, as well as western countries, to work and settle down there.98 At first 
part of the Malay archipelago and very much culturally and socially 
influenced by its neighbours, Singapore increasingly portrayed itself as a 
modern  nation of immigrants, much unlike Japan, and cultures, while 
preserved, also influence one another. Multiculturalism and multiracialism 
are embraced with pride due to their successes, at least by the government’s 
definition.99 Singaporeans learnt to live harmoniously with different races, 
though this is also the product of a state project of using multiracialism as a 
“tool for governance”, with each person being identified with a race by birth 
and whose life will be affected by various policies that are race-based.100 
Even though the Chinese eventually and till today make up the majority of 
the population (usually around 75-77%), it is often argued that no one culture 
is allowed to dominate the public sphere due to historical sensitivities and 
the political choices made by the leaders of post-WWII Singapore.101 
Generally since then, Singapore’s immigration policies have been quite open 
to foreigners, and this can be seen from how the population kept growing 
exponentially (Table 6) until much recently, despite the drop in fertility rates 
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to below replacement levels for at least three decades since the 1970s (Table 
7).102 
 













Number as at June 
1990 (Census) 3,047,132 2,735,868 2,623,736 112,132 311,264 
2000 (Census) 4,027,887 3,273,363 2,985,886 287,477 754,524 
2008 4,839,396 3,642,659 3,164,438 478,221 1,196,737 
2009 4,987,573 3,733,876 3,200,693 533,183 1,253,697 
2010 (Census) 5,076,732 3,771,721 3,230,719 541,002 1,305,011 
2011 5,183,688 3,789,251 3,257,228 532,023 1,394,437 
2012 5,312,437 3,818,205 3,285,140 533,065 1,494,232 
2013 5,399,162 3,844,751 3,313,507 531,244 1,554,411 
2014 5,469,724 3,870,739 3,343,030 527,709 1,598,985 
Average Annual Growth (%) 
1990 (Census) 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.3 9.0 
2000 (Census) 2.8 1.8 1.3 9.9 9.3 
2008 5.5 1.7 1.0 6.5 19.0 
2009 3.1 2.5 1.1 11.5 4.8 
2010 (Census) 1.8 1.0 0.9 1.5 4.1 
2011 2.1 0.5 0.8 -1.7 6.9 
2012 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.2 7.2 
2013 1.6 0.7 0.9 -0.3 4.0 
2014 1.3 0.7 0.9 -0.7 2.9 





Table 7 Fertility rate in Singapore (1970-2014) 
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 2014 
Total Fertility Rate (per female) 3.07 1.82 1.83 1.60 1.15 1.19 1.25 
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Of late, however, it can be argued that there has been a shift in both 
countries’ immigration policies, with Singapore’s becoming 
uncharacteristically less open, and Japan’s becoming unprecedentedly less 
restrictive, and with both stances declining in coherence. The 2014 
Population in Brief annual report highlighted that Singapore’s population 
growth rate was the slowest in the last decade, with foreign employment 
growth slowing across all sectors since 2010 (Table 8).105 The immigration 
framework was also tightened in 2009.106 
 
Table 8 Labour force in Singapore 
 Labour force (‘000) at June 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total  (residents & non-residents) 2,939.9 3,030.0 3,135.9 3,237.1 3,361.8 3,443.7 3,530.8 
Residents 1,928.3 1,985.7 2,047.3 2,080.1 2,119.6 2,138.8 2,185.2 
Non-residents107 1,011.6 1,044.3 1,088.6 1,157.0 1,242.2 1,304.9 1,345.6 
Resident Participation Rate (%) 65.6 65.4 66.2 66.1 66.6 66.7 67.0 
Non-resident Participation Rate (%)  34.4 34.6 33.8 33.9 33.4 33.3 33.0 
Source: 5.1 Labour Force, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2015 (compiled from the Comprehensive Labour 
Force Survey, Manpower Research & Statistics Department, Ministry of Manpower).
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For Japan, the Immigration Control Act was last amended in June 2014 to 
make it easier for foreigners who have “advanced and specialized skills” to 
immigrate by establishing a new status of residence.109 Status categories 
were also made more flexible through loosening or total removal of previous 
requirements. In 2012, a new residency management system was introduced 
for mid- to long-term residence where the maximum period of stay is 5 years, 
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up from 3 years previously.110 Particularly noteworthy is the discernible shift 
in the government’s attitude in not just bringing in a massive number of 
immigrants each year as the rate of population change sees signs of 
recovery111, but also bringing in more lower-skilled foreign workers on whom 
Japan has kept an official closed-door policy for a long time.112 
 
Methods  
Based on the theoretical framework and research design, I make use of a 
range of sources to expound my argument. As duly noted by Irene 
Bloemraad, comparative studies are not bound by certain data sources or 
methodology, with their central features being the research design and the 
focus of analysis.113 My data comes from official sources such as government 
statements, statistics and reports, legislation, parliamentary debates, and 
more open sources such as newspapers and public forums where other social 
forces can be seen to be in action. These within-case sources are used to aid 
in process-tracing, which attempts to identity the intervening causal 
processes outlined in the theory section and to take alternative paths into 
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account.114 For the case study of Singapore, due to limited publicly available 
information about societal actors and their role in determining immigration 
policy, semi-structured exploratory interviews were carried out to 
supplement the available secondary data.115 
 
For the case study of Japan, I am only limited to analysing sources which are 
in English since I am not versed in the Japanese language. However, this 
should not be a major issue because most of the official sources are available 
in English, and while I rely heavily on The Japan Times which is a major daily 
newspaper in English and also Japan’s oldest, it is an independent source, as 
compared to most other Japanese news sources whose political leanings are 
apparent. Wherever possible, relevant news from other major Japanese daily 
newspapers will be corroborated with, keeping their reporting biases in mind.  
The usage of more than one technique to triangulate findings is in a bid to 
bolster the argument in this thesis.  
 
In the following chapter, I use the case of Japan to show how a change in the 
nature of state-society relations led its immigration policy from being 
conventionally and coherently very restrictive to become a more mixed bag 
of policies that makes its overall immigration regime less restrictive.  
  
                                                     
114
George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 206-207.  
115
These semi-structured, exploratory interviews were carried out with a total of 4 
representatives from non-governmental organisations and independent civil society activists. 
I am unable to do the same for Japan’s case due to practical limitations, but for the purposes 












Demographic and economic scholars have consistently painted a grim picture 
for the near- to long-term future of Japan because of its rapidly shrinking and 
ageing population and workforce. In 2005, it was officially stated that the 
population had started to shrink as the number of deaths overtook the 
number of births, a first since such data was recorded in 1899.116 If the 
current low fertility rates do not rise, experts have projected Japan’s 
population to shrink from 128 million in 2014 to 87 million in 2060, a 
decrease of about 40 million in 50 years, leading many to believe that one of 
the world’s leading economies is in danger.117 
 
Throughout the 1990s till the mid 2000s, Japan’s immigration policy 
consistently followed the same restrictive logic, to the point that some 
scholars had labelled it as ‘lacking’ an immigration policy since it did not exist 
to bring in migrants, but to bar entry to them. For reasons that will be 
explicated, Japan has resorted to certain migration-related and non-
migration related measures to manage the demographic and economic 
issues. The latter include ramping up on automation and the use of 
technology, getting women and the elderly to be active again in the 
workforce while at the same time encouraging more births. While these 
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measures may vary in their effectiveness due to conflicting interests, what 
they point to is the persistent refusal to budge from the conventionally 
restrictive immigration stance, until recently.  
 
Japan in the 2000s serves as my first case study of how a change in state-
society relations can explain the shift in the coherence and nature of 
immigration policy from a restrictive to a more mixed one. The following 
should take place if my explanatory framework is to be justifiable:  
 
 A breakdown in image of the state as the unitary and legitimate actor 
 A change in configuration and interaction of relevant actors who 
employ strategies to expand their influence in the arena 
 Outcome: the state’s incorporation of social forces results in the 
change in immigration policy stance in terms of coherence  
 
4.1 Japan’s restrictive immigration policy  
Migdal identified Japan as a strong state as it fulfils the necessary and 
sufficient criteria for its emergence. He describes Japan as “the only country 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America not settled and dominated by Europeans 
that emerged directly from the disruptions of the late nineteenth century 
with concentrated social control.”118 
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As a strong state, Japan wields a high concentration of social control over 
various levels of society where it determines the rules in multiple arenas for 
its people who generally conform to them and ensure others do so too.119 
This is in large part due to it also being a developmental state120, which 
means that Japan has an efficient bureaucracy which has autonomous 
powers to implement capitalist economic initiatives, an integrated political 
system that lends sound structure to the economy and its growth, and a 
legitimacy that is dependent on its performance in promoting and sustaining 
development.121 Thus far this legitimacy has been sustained by successful 
economic development and growth, keeping the image and practice of a 
state aligned. These circumstances translate to a relatively weak society in 
Japan. The Japanese state can then be said to have integrated domination 
over society and this is especially apparent in the arena of immigration 
policy.122 Furthermore, there is a tendency for ideas and institutions to 
persist long after the initial circumstances that gave rise to them have 
changed, influencing policymaking as a result of path dependency.123 For 
Japan, the ideas of ethnic homogeneity and economic superiority continue to 
be perpetuated in public discourse by conservative actors even as realities on 
the ground have changed.  
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Immigration policy arena: main actors 
Lawmakers and bureaucrats in Japan are known to be mostly conservative 
with regard to immigration, as is to be expected of a non-traditional 
immigrant nation (though this does not mean that they have had no history 
of immigration, a fact that many recent English-language scholarship miss out 
on).124 This is manifest in their refusal to liberalise immigration policies, 
despite the strong practical arguments and pressures from businesses, which 
have been placated with short-term solutions. Instead they choose to focus 
their efforts on dealing with illegal immigration.125 In each key ministry there 
is an elite group of permanent bureaucrats who wields considerable power in 
policymaking, quite independent of elected officials.126 In the immigration 
policy arena, the key ministries are the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of 
Health, Labour, and Welfare, both of which are very conservative towards 
immigration.127 
 
The anti-immigration climate was not helped by politicians and the media 
which perpetuated the link between foreigners, and crime and social 
disorder, fuelling anti-immigrant sentiments among domestic interest groups 
and the general public. Furthermore, politicians are known to be reluctant in 
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challenging or permitting others to challenge Japan’s racial homogeneity, and 
laws against racial discrimination are yet to be passed, leaving Japan amongst 
the few industrialised countries where it is legal.128 Against this backdrop, 
exporting capital had been the prime option for Japan, rather than importing 
labour. Hence its immigration policy remained restrictive for a long time, only 
allowing labour which was highly skilled to be imported. Even then, the 
conditions to be met by such immigrants were challenging and the security of 
the statuses, temporary.129 Up till the mid-2000s, advocates for a more open 
immigration policy or for better rights for foreigners were increasing in 
numbers and types (academics, politicians, business organisations), but 
achieved little result in persuading the government to pursue a less 
restrictive stance and the public to welcome more foreigners, beyond 
accepting those already living in their midst.130 
 
This is largely because the societal actors in the arena of immigration policy 
were configured in a dispersed manner, rendering them ineffectual against 
the state’s integrated domination in the arena. The state’s continued 
dominance was particularly aided by the fact the public opinion regarding 
immigration remains largely negative, mirroring the government policies 
which treated foreign workers “as a phenomenon to be tightly controlled and 
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kept at arms’ length from the routines of Japanese life, rather than one that 
is to be accepted” in a supposedly unchanging, homogeneous Japanese 
society.131 In 2010, the daily Asahi Shimbun carried out a survey of about 
2,400 voters, 65% of whom responded that they opposed a more open 
immigration policy.132 However, as the immigration literature on public 
opinion tells us, such polls need to be treated with caution because the public 
can be quite undiscerning with regard to different aspects of immigration 
policy and may lump or generalise negative sentiments towards immigration. 
For instance, Junichi Goto, a professor of economics at Keio University and an 
expert on immigration issues, opines that “few people are opposed to 
bringing in more foreign professionals to reinvigorate the economy”, but 
polls rarely differentiate.133 The broadness of public opinion can be 
advantageous to the Japanese media, especially the right-leaning ones, which 
regularly hypes up stories of foreigners committing criminal acts.134 Because 
of this distorted playing field, other experts pointed out that they viewed the 
government as having a central role in facilitating the acceptance of 
foreigners by Japanese people in the local communities by building up 
infrastructure so that local issues can be managed well.135 This suggested 
state-centric approach lends further support to the point that Japan was 
being viewed as a strong state by its constituents and hence was expected to 
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lead efforts in overcoming negative public opinion and promoting acceptance 
of immigrants. 
 
Immigration policy arena: brief history 
Migrants in Japan are commonly categorised into two camps – the 
‘oldcomers’ and the ‘newcomers’. Coming out of over two centuries of 
isolation during the Edo period (also known as the Tokugawa period between 
1603-1868), foreigners were allowed into Japan beginning from 1859 but 
were restricted to living in certain settlements, until 1899 when the 
restrictions were removed for westerners.136 The Chinese and Korean 
workers who made up the majority of unskilled foreign workers, brought into 
modern Japan by western merchants coming from China and Japanese 
companies respectively, continued to live under restrictions up till World War 
II.137 The ‘oldcomers’ usually refer to the Koreans (largest minority 
group/foreign presence in Japan due to Japanese colonisation of Korea in 
1910) and the Chinese who entered and stayed on in Japan before World 
War II. While they assimilated well (having Japanese sounding names and 
Japanese language fluency), they were heavily discriminated against, with 
social and political rights denied to them.138 The ‘newcomers’ are a mixture 
of East and Southeast Asians. While some of them may come from the same 
origin countries as their predecessors, they embody a more diverse profile 
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and migrate under vastly different circumstances, where the younger 
generation of Japanese are less discriminatory and they are the much-needed 
labour in the milieu of rapid economic growth.139 
 
The Alien Registration Law (initially the Alien Registration Ordinance) came 
into effect in April 1947. It required non-nationals to register with local 
authorities within 90 days of entering Japan, a way to “monitor and control 
foreigners”.140 It entailed eighteen categories within which foreigners could 
legally reside in Japan, with seven out of those permitting employment.141 
The Ordinance became the Law when the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
commenced in 1952, disenfranchising the Korean and Taiwanese residents of 
their Japanese nationality which they acquired during the colonial rule, 
making them ineligible for social welfare and public sector employment.142 At 
the same time, Japanese nationality took on a more assimilationist tone, as 
criteria for naturalisation included using Japanese surnames and discarding 
their original names to the detriment of their kinship ties. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s heralded a new wave of post-war immigration for 
Japan, which was otherwise quite insular to the outside world. With its ever 
decreasing pool of rural migrants to depend on, the debate about 
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immigration policy was opening up.143 Most of these post-war migrants were 
Latin Americans of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin) and trainees from nearby 
Asian countries.144 In 1990, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition 
Act (ICRRA) was revised, a first since it came into force in 1982, as a result of 
the first migration debate which took place in the late 1980s.145 Immigration 
procedures were made simpler and new categories of employment were 
added to raise the number to twenty-eight for legal residence and fourteen 
for legal employment.146 Nikkeijin visas also started issuance, and 
descendants of Japanese emigrants to Latin America (especially Brazil) a 
century ago to work on coffee plantations helped fill in the three-K jobs 
(kitanai, kiken, kitsui – dirty, dangerous and difficult) that were facing 
increasing labour shortages.147 The opening of doors to large-scale 
immigration of Nikkeijins was accompanied by an increased restrictiveness in 
immigration policy towards migrants looking for low-wage work in Japan, as 
bilateral visa waiver agreements with several countries were temporarily 
removed.148 However, the pressures from Japanese businesses and smaller-
scale subcontractors149 resulted in the government starting technical 
programs which aimed to provide a win-win situation whereby developing 
countries could send their workers for training and learning in Japan, and less 
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emphasised, Japanese companies could get some relief in terms of 
manpower shortage. In the revised immigration act, the basic thrusts of 
Japanese immigration policy remained the same – foreigners are only to be 
hired as a last resort when all other avenues have been explored. If they are 
hired, only highly skilled workers should be taken in on a short-term basis, 
and no unskilled labour should be admitted.150 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the 2000s, more voices had called for changes to the 
stagnant immigration policy and a second debate on how to reform migration 
policy was launched, mainly precipitated by increasingly apparent 
demographic and economic realities151, and questions such as officially 
opening up to low-skilled workers and long-term settlement of foreigners 
were thrown to the foreground. However, owing to the dispersed manner in 
which societal actors were organised, as well as a restrictive political 
opportunity structure in which the powerful bureaucracy dominates 
initiatives, societal actors’ access to policymaking was limited.152 
 
Immigration policy arena: coherently restrictive  
Japan’s immigration policy post-WWII up till the late 2000s could be 
described as coherently restrictive as reflected in the overall nature of the 
policy domain, and there is consistency in issue framing, concentration of 
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interests in society, and specific policy targeting of who would affected by 
what the government sets out in laws, regulations, decisions or orders with 
regards to the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of non-
nationals. By 2007, Japan’s immigration regime was still perceived as 
“intolerant” for immigrants and refugees with the government showing much 
disinterest in opening the doors. This is despite its wealth and democracy, 
which have been argued in literature as good predictors of a more liberal 
immigration policy, and despite the fact that it faces severe labour shortages 
and a declining population.153 
 
All foreigners need a status of residence to enter Japan, either a permanent 
residency (PR) or a non-PR, in which case there is a range of statuses 
depending on the type of job a foreigner is legally permitted to do in Japan. 
At this general level, the range of statuses remained roughly the same 
throughout the years since the institution of the Alien Registration Law in 
1952, until the revisions in 1990 which expanded the number of categories 
for statuses. The issue framing of foreigners as temporary workers with 
limited rights and periods of stay remained consistent, with a concentration 
of interests in preventing illegal migration (and understandably so, given the 
reality of this) more than developing the immigration policy to cope with 
labour and demographic challenges. The policies were mainly targeted at 
highly-skilled workers and Nikkeijins, with low-skilled or unskilled workers 
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officially unwelcomed and those who were already in Japan doing the three-K 
jobs receiving little or no attention with regard to their rights and security of 
status.  
 
Other than the ICCRA, the Basic Plan for Immigration Control is the other 
major policy guideline which is put forth every five years or so. As specified in 
the ICCRA, the Minister of Justice will initiate this plan “to set forth 
immigration control guidelines and other measures” with regard to 
foreigners entering and residing in Japan, and to ensure that there is 
transparency as to what these measures are and assurance that they would 
be implemented.154 By the second edition of the Basic Plan in 2000, the 
government was still holding on to a restrictive view of immigration policy, 
with an emphasis on doing lots of research beforehand and taking a very 
deliberate and cautious approach towards bringing in foreigners “in a way 
that would cause little friction with society”.155 The issue focus is still very 
much on national safety first, even more so as globalisation advances in the 
international community, as evident in this statement: “the 
internationalisation of the Japanese society and facilitation of the acceptance 
of foreigners should be promoted only on conditions that social safety and 
order would be maintained”.156 Though it seems only logical that a state 
prioritises the safety of its society, it is useful to highlight the extreme extents 
this could go and has gone to when we analyse how the government’s notion 
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of ‘safety’ is aligned with the official discourses linking foreigners and 
criminality. 
 
In the third edition of the Basic Plan for Immigration Control which was 
released in 2005, the issue was framed in a more or less similar manner with 
a slight addition – tourists became policy targets as well, as evident from this 
statement: “there is now a need for the immigration control administration 
to take measures to establish Japan as a country built on tourism by 
encouraging foreign travellers to visit Japan”.157 Highly-skilled foreigners 
were still much sought after, with incentives of flexible requirements and 
extensions of stay, while the low-skilled foreigners continue to be excluded 
from the immigration plans. However, there seem finally to be hints that the 
government is considering to include the latter in some way, as evinced in: 
“the time has also come for the immigration control administration to 
consider what the acceptance of foreign workers should be in a population-
declining age”… “accepting foreign workers in fields that are not valued as 
professional or technical at present will also be given consideration…”.158 
Safety remains a major concern, as depicted by this statement: “despite 
Japan’s strict immigration control, a significant number of foreign nationals 
are expected to attempt to enter Japan with forged or altered documents 
owing to the factor of the economic gap between Japan and neighbouring 
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countries”.159 This repetitive notion that occurs throughout the plan and 
across plans serves to inevitably, by complementing a restrictive immigration 
policy with such negative expectations of foreign nationals, highlight that (1) 
Japan remains very attractive to foreigners, and (2) some foreigners will do 
anything it takes to get in, underscoring their propensity for illegal entry. 
 
There are basically a few categories of eligible migrants under the policy field 
of labour. First, highly skilled foreigners whose professions and technical 
groups are specifically outlined in the categories under the Law.160 Second, 
trainees from developing countries, under the Industrial Training Program 
(ITP) which lasts for one year and was started in 1981, and under the 
Technical Internship Program (TIP) which is a two-year extension for trainees 
to continue to work but at legal wage level, started in 1993.161 These 
programs are officially for the purposes of skill transfer and development of 
human resources under Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) but 
they have been heavily criticised  as a ‘backdoor’ for cheap, unskilled labour 
for companies without going against the official line of the ‘no unskilled 
workers’ immigration policy. Currently 19% of all foreign workers in Japan are 
trainees.162 Third, co-ethnics, or migrants of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin), 
who are officially invited and legally permitted to work in Japan without 
much restriction on their job scopes but often end up in low-wage jobs in the 
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car manufacturing industry and small and medium Japanese companies as de 
facto unskilled workers.163 
 
The state’s attitude towards labour migrants are that they are temporary, as 
exemplified by the fact that the period of stay usually cannot exceed 3 years, 
leading some to overstay and continue working or change their jobs thus 
becoming ‘undocumented workers’ according to Japan’s immigration policy.  
This state of affairs does not create a security of status, since the duration of 
employment is quite restricted, with little room for manoeuvre, and the 
status of overstayers remains unclear in terms of whether they would be 
deported or allowed to extend their visas. For the Nikkeijins, it seemed at the 
outset that their status would be secure, looking at how the Japanese 
government was welcoming them with open arms and little restrictions 
based on their ‘Japanese blood’. However, in 2009, due to the global 
economic downturn and the growing realisation that Nikkeijins may not be as 
assimilable as initially thought, the Japanese government offered a one-way 
ticket (comprising of monetary incentives) to Brazilian Nikkeijins, who are the 
third largest minority after Koreans and Chinese, to return home indefinitely 
(at first).  This is despite the fact that Japan needs to augment its labour force 
in the face of its ageing and shrinking population while its foreign-born 
workers make up only 1.7% of the total population. The very low proportion 
of foreign labour is due to strict immigration laws as “the discussion of 
immigration reform is notoriously absent in Japan, and reaching a sensible 
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policy for foreign workers has hardly got under way”.164 This move has been 
widely criticised by some societal actors because the state was seen as 
backtracking on its stance towards the Nikkeijins. The Nikkeijins were at first 
very welcomed, and the government had just promoted programs a few 
months before that to “make it easier for jobless immigrants to remain”, such 
as helping them with job searches and their children’s education, which was 
an unprecedented move in the immigration-wary Japan.165 
 
In terms of family reunification, Japan does not grant such rights to migrant 
labourers, except for Nikkeijins who have ancestral ties to Japan, making it 
the only advanced industrial democracy reluctant to do so.166 Furthermore, 
citizenship is not automatically granted to families that have lived in Japan for 
several generations, such as the Koreans and Chinese who made up the 
majority of the ‘oldcomers’.167 This is due to the jus sanguinis nature of 
citizenship that Japanese nationality law holds, and where naturalisation is 
allowed but extremely restricted.  The idea of citizenship in Japan is closely 
linked to ethnic homogeneity or cultural assimilation, and as long as these 
contents do not change, the present of idea of Japan as a nation would 
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continue to be ‘threatened’ by immigration of diverse peoples, hence making 
immigration a difficult issue.168 
 
As I have set out to demonstrate, Japan’s immigration policy has consistently 
been restrictive generally and within individual policy fields. What have been 
the major explanations in literature for this coherence which seemed to defy 
rational economic and demographic logics? Scholars have argued that based 
on the elements present in the immigration policy, such as official narratives 
espoused by government officials which omit the historical fact that Japan 
experienced immigration after the end of the isolation period to project the 
image of Japan as an original ethnically homogeneous nation, the consistent 
stance of preventing “foreigners in general from staying long or settling 
down” and the rare usage of the term ‘migrant’ (imin) in public discourse169, 
the ethnonational concerns remain strong. These ethnonational concerns 
include fears of cultural dilution of its ethnic homogeneity which would 
necessarily result in a breach of “domestic security and social stability”.170 
Tsuda also argues that the “Ministry of Justice emerged at the top of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy in terms of immigration policy-making” as it “wrested 
control over immigration policy-making from other ministries and agencies 
and did not give in to economic pressures” and that it was staffed with 
conservative bureaucrats who believe in Japan’s ethnic homogeneity and the 
need to guard it, hence “its restrictive position was directly reflected in 
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Japan’s 1990s revised ICCRA”.171 This shows us that (1) state organisations 
are not equal or united, and (2) the position of the Ministry of Justice is the 
state’s position because this particular state actor managed to dominate the 
arena of immigration policymaking, lending credence to framework in this 
thesis. It is understandable how the discourse of ethnic homogeneity and the 
consensus on the unique identity of the Japanese can remain in place after so 
long since it was part of the modern nation-building project in Japan172 , yet it 
can be argued that this major reason for policy coherence has taken a 
backseat in recent years.  
 
4.2 Increasing incoherence: evidences of shift in immigration policy 
The earlier reform debates in the 1980s and early 2000s showed no great 
departure from a restrictive immigration policy, as the policy outcomes of 
those debates were either negligible or minimally tinkered with at best, 
though it can be noted that the proposals put forth signalled that changes in 
perceptions in some circles of state and societal actors were taking place.173 
This imperceptible difference is opposed to debates in the late 2000s. There 
was an increase in ‘multiculturalism’ talk, in variegated voices within the 
government and in the public sphere (more than just anti-immigrant 
sympathisers), and a significant shift from previous years where “no 
organisation was advocating for substantially increased levels of immigration 
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aimed at the long-term stay and integration of foreigners into Japanese 
society”.174 Besides the increase in quantity, variation, and intensity of 
alternative voices in the immigration policy arena, Japan’s immigration policy 
stance became increasingly incoherent, with some elements becoming less 
restrictive, as issue framing, concentration of interests and policy targeting 
started losing their consistency and narrow focus. As opposed to the past two 
decades where Japan’s immigration policy remained unshaken, the 
announcement in the 2005 Basic Plan of considerations to bring in foreign 
workers who are not in the professional and technical fields as currently 
defined can be argued to be a harbinger of a change in the pattern of 
domination in the immigration policy arena.  
 
At the general level, in the late 2000s, we can see that the range of statuses 
of residences has been modified when the amendments to the ICCRA were 
lately promulgated in 2014 and target numbers of immigrants are actually 
being put forth. Some statuses have also been combined in an effort to be 
more flexible with regard to job categories, hence making immigration policy 
in part less restrictive. For instance, the status of “Investor/Business 
Manager” has been simplified to “Business Manager” to remove the 
requirement of being connected to foreign investment while increasing the 
range of related activities of business management and operation for 
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foreigners to engage in.175  On the other hand, the statuses of “Engineer” and 
“Specialist in Humanities/International Services” are being combined starting 
from 1 April 2015 in order to be more flexible towards the needs of 
companies which transcend the division of knowledge between science and 
humanities.176 
 
In 2006, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tasked a government panel of 
ministers and senior officials to embark on nationwide discussions and “to 
study measures to enable society to accept foreign workers smoothly” to 
prevent an economic slowdown, cognisant of the potential frictions and 
social costs that would surface and need to be planned ahead for.177 This 
move was lauded by many, such as immigration expert Hidenori Sakanaka, 
private-sector members who advocate that foreign labour should be 
accepted in all business categories to meet labour shortage, and welfare 
groups who advocate for better living conditions for foreign labourers and 
believe that the central government needs to take charge since local 
governments have limited budgets to support foreigners. The current prime 
minister, Shinzo Abe, was the then Chief Cabinet Secretary in the government 
panel and he had proposed setting up a cross-ministry taskforce for 
discussion, highlighting the need for the government and companies to step 
up and offer “sufficient assistance over employment and education for 
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foreigners and their children” if the domestic labour market is to be opened 
to foreigners.178 Though this effort did not yield significant changes, it set the 
course for subsequent shifts in the immigration policy arena.  
 
In 2009, changes were made to the Immigration Control Act. Immigration bill 
revisions were passed and they would come into effect within 3 years. The 
major change would be the abolition of the Alien Registration Act, which will 
be replaced by a new residence management system in 2012 that would 
benefit both foreign residents and permanent residents in terms of 
convenience, with the maximum period of stay extended from 3 to 5 years 
for most professions, and a waiver of re-entry formalities.179 The training and 
technical internship programs were also revised to increase protections for 
trainees and interns, while the “college student” and “pre-college student” 
statuses would be integrated, and junior high and elementary school 
students would be included to “ensure the stable stay of foreign students”.180 
As an effort to promote “international exchanges from younger ages in the 
field of education”, this is a significant move for the future of Japan.181 It does 
not only open up Japan to the world and for these students to consider 
migrating to Japan, but  also nurtures the next generation of Japanese to be 
more open to people from other cultures studying and living in their midst 
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from young. The increase in convenience of not having to re-apply to change 
their status should they proceed to college in Japan is meant to attract more 
students to stay on and join the workforce after. While these changes are not 
drastic in that they shift the immigration policy from being coherently 
restrictive to entirely welcoming, they do alter the coherence because the 
new measures to be implemented increase the security of status and rights 
of immigrants however slightly.  
 
The 4th edition of Basic Plan for Immigration Control was released in 2010. 
Similar to prior editions, every subsequent basic plan takes note of any 
changes relevant to immigration administration, and suggests guidelines to 
be taken for the next few years. The first initiative to be taken was to deal 
with the serious population decline in order to maintain the vitality and 
sustainable development of Japan as well as to take advantage of the 
vibrancy of the Asian region by promoting “the policy of actively accepting 
foreign nationals”.182 The report acknowledges that the growing number of 
registered foreign national with a visa for work is due to the “fact that various 
efforts are being made by the government to increase the acceptance of 
foreign students”, many of whom are then employed by Japanese 
corporations and businesses upon graduation, thus changing their statuses of 
residence for the purpose of work.183 The numbers of foreigners in the field 
of medical services and nursing care have been increasing steadily but they 
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continue to be small. This is due to the strict requirements despite society’s 
needs, such as requiring a Japanese national qualification which most of the 
time means that he or she would have had to have the “College Student” 
status of residence prior to that. This is not commonplace or a requirement 
that is easily fulfilled, and has prompted active debate which the government 
has taken notice of.184 As suggested by the 2008 proposal, the plan also 
includes the possibility for a foreign resident to acquire PR status after a 
certain number of years, which had never been considered seriously by the 
government before this.185 For smooth acceptance of foreign nationals who 
will help to “revitalize” Japanese society, the following measures will also be 
taken: a points-based system with preferential treatment for entry and 
settling down of foreigners with much needed skill-sets and easing 
qualification requirements through mutual recognition.186 The plan also 
suggested that the government is looking to be more restrictive with regard 
to the Nikkeijin visas in terms of entry requirements and residence due to 
realisations that Nikkeijins might not share as much with the Japanese in 
terms of culture, values, and language skills as expected, and it seems like 
they might soon be given equal consideration with other foreign nationals, 
instead of being given preferential status.   
 
In 2012, a points-based system was instituted to “promote entry of highly 
skilled foreign professionals” by giving “preferential treatment”, which 
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basically means being less restrictive on the conditions, giving more security 
in terms of status and conferring more rights. Some elaboration as to what 
“preferential treatment” entails: permission for multiple activities (usually 
the single status of residence dictates what a foreign national is permitted to 
do in Japan), an automatic grant of 5 years with possibility of extension, 
easing of requirements for permanent residence, quicker processing of entry 
and residence procedures, permission for the spouse of the highly skilled 
foreign professional to work, permission for bringing a parent(s) to 
accompany the highly-skilled foreign professional to Japan, and permission 
for a domestic worker to accompany the highly-skilled professional to 
Japan.187 The introduction of the points-based system arguably makes the 
issue area of highly skilled foreign professionals less restrictive than before.  
 
4.3 Shifts in immigration policy arena: change in state-society 
relations  
As evident in the late 2000s, the economic and demographic situation that 
called for immigration became more acute. In this regard, I do not discount 
the fact that these factors matter in helping explain the change in 
immigration policy in terms of coherence and direction, but I argue that the 
shift in state-society relations in the arena is under-explained in literature 
and can help us understand how Japan’s immigration policy had some parts 
becoming less restrictive, with changes in the issue framing, concentration of 
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interests, and policy targeting that overall affected the initial restrictive 
coherence.  
 
Breakdown in image of the state as the unitary, legitimate actor 
The actors in the arena have inevitably increased in variety and so have their 
stances. There was coherence in the arena among actors that dominated that 
immigration policies should remain restrictive. This is in large part due to the 
state organisations, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare in particular, which dominated the immigration 
policymaking and public discourse with their conservative stances that found 
much support in the anti-immigrant sympathisers and the general public. This 
integrated dominance is also enhanced by the continuous presence of the 
major conservative ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the 
major opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), who back the 
restrictive immigration stance bureaucrats put forth.   
 
This dominance started to waver when social forces such as civil society 
organisations and local governments begin to realise that there is a huge 
discrepancy between policy outputs and outcomes, leading to a delinking 
between the image of a strong state which is in control of immigration and its 
practices that betray the reality that it is not. This breakdown in the image of 
a strong state in the immigration policy arena is primarily caused by the 
prevalence of side-door entries of immigrants without proper national 
policies to manage them, resulting in a situation where the state says one 
76 
 
thing, but other things happen as well.188 Tsuda makes the observation that 
due to restrictive government policy that does not provide adequate rights to 
foreigners, in addition to the unintended result of increasing numbers of 
undocumented foreign workers, societal actors such as civil society 
organisations (and later joined by local governments) have had to make up 
for the lack of support for these foreigners in terms of welfare, medical 
treatment and housing, as well as by helping them integrate into society.189  
With insufficient resources, both societal and local state actors have had to 
confront the reality that the state conveniently ignores in order to maintain 
its restrictive policies, and through this, the former realise that the rules of 
the game set by the state need to be changed. 
 
This breakdown in the image of the state as the sole rulemaker has led social 
forces not only to take actions that they are capable of in a dispersed 
manner, but also to start to organise and challenge the state’s dominance in 
the arena of immigration policy. There are a number of actors with varying 
functions and influence; however, for the purposes of this thesis, I focus on 
the main ones. At the level of local governments, for the first time in 2001, 13 
mayors of cities with growing immigrant populations (mostly Nikkeijins) 
formed the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents 
(CCHFCR) to collectively appeal to the national government to reform its 
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immigration policies to take pressing realities into account.190 They were 
lacking both the financial and authoritative powers to manage the 
newcomers and recognised that they had to organise as a collective in order 
to effect policy change. Solidarity Network with Migrants in Japan (SMJ), 
together with other civil society organisations and actors, published a book of 
NGO policy proposals in 2006 to influence policymaking at the national level, 
as well as to reach out to citizens and other NGOs about the current 
problems in the migrant issue and what measures should be taken to secure 
Japan’s future as a harmonious multicultural and multiethnic state. An 
independent think tank, the Japan Immigration Policy Institute (JIPI), headed 
by Hidenori Sakanaka who is a former director of the Immigration Bureau, 
has been a vocal pro-immigration entity in the arena. Sakanaka is also well-
known in Japan for his active promotion of immigration and is often 
contacted by the local and international press to comment on government 
actions (or inactions). He was also heavily involved in the 2008 proposal to 
raise the foreign population in Japan to 10% in the next 50 years which he 
views as revolutionary if legislated.191 He reckons that the first step for Japan 
to take is to “move away from valuing homogeneity and wariness of 
individualism and begin respecting and embracing individual differences”.192 
He advocates a ‘Japanese-style immigration policy’ where young immigrants 
in Japanese universities and vocational schools are groomed, with job 
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security and PR-ship with an opportunity to gain nationality status.193 This is 
opposed to only bringing in foreign workers who come to work and then 
head home, which has been Japan’s de facto guest worker system. Of late, 
corporate leaders have also entered the fray, such as Japan’s top business 
federation, Keidanren, and are demonstrating that they are ready to embrace 
the diversity of foreigners so the government should open up its immigration 
policy.194 The labour movement in Japan, though growing, remains weak and 
have not been major influencers in policymaking thus far though they are 
traditionally thought to be defenders of family reunification for migrants.195  
With more actors coming on board, how have they fared in terms of 
devolving the autonomy of the state in policymaking?  
 
Diminishing the state’s domination in the arena – strategies of 
societal actors  
Given the restrictive political structure in which societal actors are 
embedded, they have learnt to adopt strategies that expand and strengthen 
their influence either directly or indirectly on immigration policymaking. I 
argue that the first dimension along which they have extended their 
influence is to take over an increasing number of issue areas in the arena, 
particularly in areas where the state actors are missing in action. They do so 
in two main ways. The first is through welfare and service provision, usually 
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done by non-governmental organisations for migrant workers, and the 
second is through advocacy work by challenging state discourses and 
changing issue framings.  
 
The number of NGOs in welfare and service provision has proliferated in the 
past decade to fill the void due to insufficient government support of foreign 
nationals who lack civil and political rights. What first started out as 
‘unthreatening service providers’ who work in the informal public sphere to 
provide uncoordinated assistance to immigrants, especially those who are 
deemed ‘illegal’, slowly became more than that. In what Shipper calls 
“associative activism”, local actors aim to change the status quo of “inflexible 
and relatively unresponsive political institutions” by becoming more strategic 
with their problem-solving activities which do not openly challenge 
government policies but gradually build up the network of societal actors.196 
They do so by sharing information with each other and making their service 
provision efforts known, and this helps in transforming the social meanings of 
what they do, which is not only to affect the individual lives of foreign 
workers, but also to change the overall structure that constricts their living 
conditions and rights. Their presence and experience in the areas of welfare 
and service provision have given them an edge over government officials in 
terms of proposing policies that address problems with the current 
immigration policies.  
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The narrative of foreign nationals as potential criminals, and consequently 
immigration as a security issue, has been actively challenged by migrant-
support NGOs consisting of Japanese nationals. They present an 
“oppositional voice and an informed watchdog” to the government with 
regard to challenging prevailing discourse and advocating migrants’ rights 
which are often neglected.197  As a result of the conflation of foreignness with 
criminal dispositions, immigration control through restrictive policies and 
crime control were closely linked, if not treated in the same light.198 In such a 
framing, migrants’ rights fall to the wayside as they are treated as persons to 
be wary of and not vulnerable persons who need legal protection in a foreign 
land. This discourse is also ironically the result of the lack of governmental 
management of immigrants, as NGOs are quick to point. Without access to 
social welfare and inclusion under employment protection, some migrants 
might be forced by their circumstances to commit petty crimes, especially if 
they become unemployed, and this becomes fodder for media 
sensationalisation. Some of the ways social forces have challenged this 
criminality discourse is to be deliberate about the terms that they use to 
describe migrant workers. Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ) is 
clear in their policy proposals to the government in not using the term 
‘illegal’ to describe foreign nationals who overstay their visa to work, but 
employs the term ‘undocumented’.199 They oppose the strong focus on 
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security and crackdown in the 3rd Basic Plan, noting how the basic policies 
“are to establish an overall surveillance and control system over foreign 
nationals”.200 They argue that such policies which are “rooted in xenophobia” 
only serve to increase society’s negative perceptions of foreigners and 
suspicious reactions towards them.201 Academics also have come forward to 
debunk the myth through examining statistical evidences used in backing up 
security discourses on foreign criminality and publishing those that describe 
the real picture, which is that there is no evidence that foreign workers 
commit more crimes on average than Japanese nationals.202 
 
The other prevalent official discourse is that Japan is homogeneous and 
should remain so, as encapsulated in the concept of  nihonjinron, a popular 
genre of writing on national identity, with the central tenet that “the 
Japanese are a homogeneous people who constitute a racially unified nation” 
which remains “deeply rooted in popular discourse”.203 This homogeneity is 
also implicated in the notions of Japanese society being “harmonious and 
peace-loving” and how breaking that homogeneity by bringing in foreigners 
would upset the “harmony and cooperation that characterizes Japanese 
society”, tying in with the criminality discourse.204 Such notions and image 
projections of homogeneity are not uncontroversial however. There is an 
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increasing dissonance between image of a homogeneous society and the 
reality of foreign presence that has prompted societal actors to challenge the 
homogeneity discourse even more than before when Japan was largely 
neglecting its minority and indigenous populations.205 Embedded within the 
discourse are also other familiar and related themes of xenophobia, 
disruptions to ethno-national identity, racial and cultural superiority.206 
Related to the homogeneity discourse is also the belief propagated by the 
government and some local scholars that Japan has no history of 
immigration.207 This belief has been upheld by various government policies 
and societal practices such as requiring “foreigners either to live in officially-
designated enclaves or otherwise to be contained in specific 
neighbourhoods”, and excluding Chinese and Korean residents, the 
‘oldcomers’, from the immigrant category even though they are still treated 
as foreigners.208 
 
Various proposals for multiethnic and multicultural acceptance have been 
put forth to promote a new type of society that does not get ‘threatened’ 
easily by ‘foreign elements’ in an effort to shift the negative issue framings 
thus far. The boldest plan to open the doors to immigration was proposed in 
2008 by  a group of 80 lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to 
raise the population of foreigners in Japan to 10% of the overall population in 
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the next 50 years, based on a calculation of the labour needs of Japan in the 
future.209 The proposal’s tone was urgent and unambiguous: “the only 
effective treatment to save Japan from a population crisis is to accept people 
from abroad…For Japan to survive, it needs to open its doors as an 
international state passable to the world and shift toward establishing an 
‘immigrant nation’ by accepting immigrants and revitalizing Japan”.210 The 
main highlights from the proposal are the clear expansion in immigrant 
numbers, expansion of rights (public welfare services, education) for 
immigrants while calling for a law banning racism, conditions for PR and long-
term resident statuses to be relaxed, hence making the status of foreign 
workers more secure than a working visa.211 The policy is deliberately 
opposed to the current policy, where Japan “demands only highly skilled 
foreigners or accept foreigners only for a few years to engage in simple 
labour”.212 Expectedly, there was opposition from certain anti-immigration 
movements and critics such as the Tokyo-based non-profit Foreign Criminal 
Exclusion Movement, and Kanji Nishio, a renowned nationalist critic who is 
highly sceptical of multicultural societies as a possible reality. These have 
been countered by those in the pro-immigration camp who argue that these 
issues can be resolved if equal treatment is given to immigrants and 
Japanese.213 
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By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it could be argued that there was an 
agreement among stakeholders in the industry and businesses that Japan 
was faced with a labour shortage (especially in the service sector) that could 
not be dealt with the same way as in the 1960s where rural migration could 
be counted on and automation of production was starting out.214 This 
consensus, though shared by some state actors, was not reflected in the 
restrictive immigration policies. Contrary to official discourse that perpetually 
frames foreign workers as a temporary phenomenon with biased and 
negative views  of them and whose contributions to and important roles in 
Japan’s society are not publicly recognised, Gabriele Vogt noted how “various 
government agencies, international organisations and the Japan Business 
Federation (Nippon Keidanren)” derive the same conclusion from Japan’s 
current situation (crisis of economy in the face of population shrinking) that 
migrants have become a necessity for the national economy.215 This framing 
of migrants as a vital contributor to Japan’s economic survival in the face of a 
shrinking population is opposed to other actors which hold more 
conservative views, such as the Ministry of Justice, under which the 
Immigration Bureau is housed. Such views include seeing foreign residents as 
endangering national security and public safety, therefore constituting a 
different type of crisis, and continuing to justify restrictive immigration 
policies.216 
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An approach that is increasingly used by NGOs and academics alike is to 
frame Japan as a member of the international society with obligations to fulfil 
in order to be accepted by others. For instance, Japan has the responsibility 
to accept foreign labour because it benefits from internationalisation and 
globalisation. It is thus only fair that Japan helps other countries facilitate the 
movement of their nationals as participants of the whole process217, and 
because Japanese people have been able to emigrate to other countries 
without as much hindrances since 1868.218 NGOs have also recast the notion 
of ‘national interest’ by arguing that it is not in Japan’s favour to ignore 
human rights of migrant workers who do not fit into its definition of 
“favourable” foreigners as it would lose the goodwill of at least its 
neighbouring countries from which many of its foreign workers hail.219 
 
The second dimension in which social forces have expanded their influence is 
the sheer increment in numbers that incorporates a larger share of the 
population, in terms of advocates, and also the general public who view 
immigration in a more positive light. The effectiveness of societal actors in 
Japan has been downplayed in literature by scholars who argue that the 
Japanese state remains strong and can control civil society, and that these 
groups are weak in terms of professionalisation, certification (by the 
government, such as an Non-Profit Organisation status) and manpower.220 
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These perceived weaknesses have been argued to be exactly their sources of 
strength that give them autonomy and force them to develop expertise and 
multitask, as well as find support in numbers by collaborating with other non-
governmental groups to overcome resource restraints, and with Japanese 
activists within and without the immigration policy arena.221 Their efforts in 
delivering social welfare services to foreign residents have also enabled them 
to gain the recognition of local governments to the point that the latter have 
started to cooperate with them, an important step to incorporating more 
support from state actors.222 It helps their case in diminishing state 
domination when even conventionally negative public opinion is signalling a 
shift: an Asahi Shimbun survey in March 2015 which received 2000 responses 
showed that 51% of Japanese respondents supported accepting foreigners 
who want to permanently settle, a result that it says is double of a similar 
survey in 2010, providing some evidence that Japanese society is becoming 
more open to a less restrictive immigration policy.223 But what is the result of 
social forces’ effort to expand their influence on immigration policymaking?  
 
4.4 Incorporation of social forces by the state  
While the social forces did not completely overhaul the state’s goals in 
maintaining a restrictive immigration policy, it can be argued that their 
efforts have at least led the state to consider them seriously and, in some 
instances, alter its policies and behaviour to accommodate to changing 
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circumstances. This has led to an increasing incoherence in its immigration 
policies as the state holds on to some of its basic precepts while modifying 
others. Beyond the growing partnership between Japanese immigrant rights 
NGOs and local governments where the former compels the latter to do 
more for their foreign residents, there is also a profound effect on the state. 
Instead of only the strong democratic state shaping civil society through 
selective promotion and regulation of organisations and actors according to 
its rules, societal actors are also “shaping the role and responsibilities of the 
state”.224 The increasing presence of foreign workers despite a restrictive 
stance with insufficient governmental support has inevitably resulted in a 
situation where national leaders are made more aware of the gap that needs 
to be filled. This has manifested in more studies and proposals for 
immigration reform and multicultural acceptance being put forth by state 
organisations from the mid-2000s onwards.225 This increased awareness and 
subsequent related actions are an important sign that state-society relations 
have experienced a major shift compared to a decade earlier when society 
was relatively weak and societal actors did not have much influence on 
immigration policymaking.  
 
The current administration under PM Shinzo Abe has been reported making 
public statements that reflect a shift is taking place in the immigration policy 
arena. The Abe administration was considering bringing in “massive number 
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of immigrants” across skill levels for mid- to long-term development of 
Japan.226 PM Abe was also reported to have made a promise to world 
business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2014 that 
more foreign workers will be accepted, and this was interpreted by some 
political analysts as a significant harbinger of a policy shift.227 In any case, 
political commentators have also noted how PM Abe’s long-term economic 
growth plan signals the need for immigration growth for it to work, a 
“significant change from Japan’s long-standing reluctance to [officially] 
accept foreign workers”.228 
 
4.5 Concluding assessment  
Some observers would argue that the discourse of “homogeneous Japan” is 
still dominant and pervasive and continues to inform immigration 
policymaking and public opinion, notwithstanding clear, rational and logical 
arguments for an open immigration policy.229 Through this case study, I aim 
to demonstrate that the ‘ethnic hypothesis’ has weakened considerably in 
light of new developments. For instance, the fact that most of the NGOs and 
societal actors advocating for foreigners' rights are established by Japanese 
citizens goes against accepted narratives about Japanese racism and 
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insularity towards foreigners and underscores the role of "political 
constructions by certain government elites" and how these are changing.230 
 
Hirata and Warschauer argue that Japan now faces a “crisis of harmony”. The 
traditional ways that have helped them attain success after the devastation 
of the Second World War are now impeding their future.231 These include 
utmost deference to the elderly, who make up a huge and growing 
proportion of the population, rigid gender roles, as well as being hostile to 
outside influences, in terms of immigrants, ideas, and markets.232  Hirata and 
Warschauer juxtapose Japan’s languishing state with other countries in Asia 
that have embraced globalisation. If the shift in the immigration policy arena 
is anything to go by, there is hope for Japan to break out of its mould and 
overcome this ‘crisis’.  
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Similar to Japan, Singapore’s demographic issues (ageing population and 
workforce, low birthrates) and economic imperatives, though not as acute, 
are the main drivers of its open immigration policy that brings in foreign 
labour of various skill levels.233 A government paper titled “Citizen Population 
Scenarios” by the National Population and Talent Division (NPTD) released in 
2012 projected that Singapore’s citizen population will start to shrink as 
deaths overtake births by 2025 if there is no permanent immigration and 
with current low birth rates at about 1.2 babies born per woman.234 In the 
same scenario, by 2030, there will only be 2.1 working-age citizens (20-64 
years) to support each elderly citizen (65 years and above) by 2030.235 The 
paper surmised that the effects of a declining and ageing citizen population 
cannot be reduced by improving the fertility rate alone, especially in the next 
two decades, so the mitigating solution is immigration.236 Furthermore, 
seeing that Singapore is an island-state with almost no natural resources, its 
long-term survival is very much dependent on securing enough human 
resources.  
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Thus far the above factors have been sufficiently perpetuated in public 
discourse to the point that open immigration policies up till the mid 2000s 
have been generally accepted by the public without much dissent. Whether 
these policies have been effective in addressing the demographic issues is up 
for debate because the publicly available data on resident birth rates show 
only aggregate figures, and no separate data on new citizens and permanent 
residents. Nonetheless, foreign workers do contribute significantly in making 
up for labour shortfall in certain sectors of the workforce and towards 
economic growth, and hence the open immigration stance has remained 
largely unopposed since the 1980s.  
 
Singapore in the 2000s serves as my second case study of how a change in 
state-society relations can explain the shift in the coherence and nature of 
immigration policy from an open to a more mixed one. The following should 
take place if my explanatory framework is to be justifiable:   
 A breakdown in image of the state as the unitary and legitimate 
actor 
 A change in configuration and interaction of relevant actors who 
employ strategies to expand their influence in the arena 
 Outcome: the state’s incorporation of social forces results in the 




5.1 Singapore’s open immigration policy   
Singapore can be neatly classified as a strong state according to Migdal’s 
definition. It has a “tremendous concentration of social control,” which is 
concentrated within the one-party dominant state and its agencies. It 
emerged amidst a tumultuous period of Japanese occupation during World 
War II, subsequent decolonisation and the short merger with Malaya before 
being forced into independence, all of which destabilised existing strategies 
of survival and set the path for a concentration of political control by skilful 
elites against external threats and internal instability. These elites shared the 
perception that “stronger state institutions were necessary to check the 
considerable combined threat posed by communalism and the radical 
Left”237, and the strong state continued well into the post-independence era 
with a developmental core to deal with the political and economic 
uncertainty.238 The developmental state paradigm of the government viewed 
economic growth as “the prime driver of domestic stability and external 
appeal” and this is further entrenched by the lack of natural resources and 
limited human resources.239 
 
With the People’s Action Party (PAP) ruling in an overwhelming majority 
since independence, the Singapore state has had integrated domination over 
society as it makes a wide range of rules, from public policies that focused on 
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economic growth and political stability all the way down to the private lives 
of citizens.240 The image of a strong state has been bolstered over the years 
by Singapore’s economic success ‘from Third World to First’241 and other 
accolades it receives from the international community, lending credible 
performance legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens that has kept the dominant 
party in power.242 Similarly with Japan, and perhaps more so, the society in 
Singapore is weak. This is ensured by design, as evident in the Societies Act 
which “restricts freedom of association by requiring most organizations of 
more than 10 people to register with the government, and only registered 
parties and associations may engage in organised political activity”243. There 
is also the Trade Unions Act which bans government employees from joining 
unions and where all unions are nationalised under the National Trades 
Union Congress (NTUC) which is openly under the supervision of the state.244 
The state also closely monitors the mainstream media. Society is weak to the 
point that some scholars have described Singapore, among other labels, as an 
authoritarian state, a semi-democracy, an illiberal democracy with an 
ideological hegemony over its populace, particularly the working class, which 
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has helped it garner obedience.245 The arena of immigration policy is no 
exception – the government has often utilised a paternalistic approach in 
policymaking, though this has slowly evolved to include more societal 
participation over the years as the second and third prime ministers took 
over. For Singapore, the ideas of demographic realities, economic 
imperatives, and ethnic diversity were prevalent in government discourse on 
immigration and why Singapore needed to remain open to all types of 
foreigners that can contribute to Singapore.  
 
Immigration policy arena: main actors 
The PAP government, led by the Ministry of Manpower, works closely with 
the Economic Development Board to craft immigration policies that make 
economic and business sense.246  It has been typical of the government to 
practise “top-down, hierarchical model of decision-making” since self-
governance in 1959.247 Expert knowledge was sought, but not so much of 
public consultation and participation since the ruling elites held perceptions 
that the general masses did not know better.248 With such an elitist 
approach, the government has been able to initiate or reverse unpopular 
policies whose necessity it managed to convince the citizens of, including the 
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mass influx of foreigners following a receptive immigration policy.249 Until 
recent years, societal actors such as opposition parties and civil society 
organisations remained on the sidelines, and public opinion on immigration 
in general was not adversarial because the economy was doing well and 
immigration had not yet become a hot-button issue. Therefore, societal 
influence on immigration policymaking remained dispersed in the arena 
which was largely state-centric. 
 
Immigration policy arena: brief history 
Immigration has always been part and parcel of Singapore’s demographic 
history since its founding in 1819. Under colonial governance then, 
immigrants from different countries and cultures congregated in the city-
state.250 Upon independence in 1965, the government of the day managed 
the resulting “mosaic of plural cultures as well as the vestige of racial 
tensions” through its own version of multiculturalism which permeated 
public policies in education, housing, electoral representation, and the 
management of multicultural relations.251 The state had to do something 
about the “high population growth and unemployment rates” and 
immigration then was limited to “only those who could contribute to its 
                                                     
249
 Hussin Mutalib, Singapore Malays: being ethnic minority and Muslim in a global city-state 
(Routledge, 2012), 152.  
250
 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “Introduction: Immigration, emigration, and return migration in 
Singapore,” in The Age of Asian Migration: Continuity, Diversity, and Susceptibility Volume 1, 
eds. Yuk Wah Chan, David Haines and Jonathan H.X. Lee (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 





socioeconomic development”.252 The interventionist migration policy 
executed by the state then was mainly based on economic considerations, 
but with a keen eye on ensuring the multicultural setting was not 
neglected.253 This is evident in the ethnic composition which has changed 
little since independence despite the different waves of immigration in the 
1980s onwards.254 
 
Immigrants in Singapore can also be divided into the ‘oldcomers’ or the early 
immigrants whose descendants are the Singaporeans of today, many from 
China and India, and the ‘newcomers’ of recent years who are more diverse 
in composition. The fact that Singapore is a migrant society has often been 
used by the state and echoed by some segments of the public to persuade 
Singaporeans to accept the new immigrants, though some do differentiate 
the immigrants of yesteryears and today, wherein the latter’s commitments 
are often questioned because migrants of this day and age are thought to be 
more mobile and quick to seize a better opportunity elsewhere.255 
 
Alongside selective immigration, the overly successful ‘Stop at Two’ family 
planning programme in the 1970s reintroduced the need to augment 
population numbers and meet manpower needs. In the 1980s through to the 
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1990s, Singapore began to liberalise its immigration policy.256 For instance, in 
1989, Singapore made the headlines as it opened its door to Hong Kong 
workers, offering them permanent residence at a time when many nations 
kept their doors closed. Regulations were eased across the board – for 
entrepreneurs, for spouses and family reunification. The then prime minister 
Lee Kuan Yew stated that immigration should be a long-term plan, to make 
up for the brain drain as other countries began to attract more Singaporeans 
and for the low birthrate.257 Under the second prime minister Goh Chok 
Tong, an open immigration policy was continued, though there were more 
security of status and rights for skilled workers than unskilled workers, and 
for foreign wives of Singaporean men than foreign husbands of Singaporean 
women.258 
 
At the cusp of the millennium, the then deputy prime minister Lee Hsien 
Loong affirmed the state’s decision to continue attracting foreign talent 
“regardless of the state of the economy” and that “Singapore’s immigration 
policy was multiracial” where “talent regardless of race or origin” was 
sought.259 From very early on, the idea that there was never enough talent in 
Singapore was perpetuated in support of the open immigration policy, and 
rarely was it questioned what ‘enough’ was, and if there was such a 
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benchmark to reach or if limitless growth was the aim. In his 2001 National 
Day Rally speech, PM Goh highlighted the centrality and continuance of his 
government’s immigration policy, in particular of importing ‘foreign talents’, 
even during an economic downturn despite local resentment because it was 
a “matter of life and death for us in the long term”.260 Political commentators 
suggested that the reason the Singapore government could do this was 
because it was more secure than other governments in Southeast Asia, and 
there was no immediate fear of any serious challenge to the government. In 
2006, the Citizenship and Population Unit under the Prime Minister’s Office 
was set up to promote immigration of “all kinds of talent” to Singapore as the 
global competition for talent got more intense, showing how important this 
issue continued to be in the national agenda dominated by the state.261 
 
Immigration policy arena: coherently open 
Singapore’s immigration policy post-1980s could be described as coherently 
open, as reflected in the overall nature of the policy domain, and there is 
consistency in issue framing, concentration of interests, and policy targeting. 
However, while the overall immigration policy can be described as ‘open’, the 
term applies slightly differently in terms of individual policies. High-skilled 
foreigners or ‘foreign talents’ have also been the ones the government wants 
to attract to stay. As compared to low-skilled or unskilled workers (‘foreign 
workers’), the former thus have more security of status and rights, though 
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both are liberally selected and admitted.262 Up till the mid-2000s, integration 
or immigrant incorporation was not really a focus of the policies. 
 
All foreigners intending to stay in Singapore for a period of time for both 
work and non-work related purposes need a suitable immigration pass. At 
the general level, the types of jobs under each category of work passes are 
not limited to a certain set of occupations, allowing a wide range of 
foreigners to be eligible. Up till 2007, there were no pre-set quotas for each 
category of foreigners seeking work or residence in Singapore. A poll by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2005 found Singapore’s immigration policies 
“among the friendliest in the world”, attractive to corporations, and 
comprehensive.263 The issue framing of foreigners as much needed in the 
labour workforce at various skill levels and in augmenting the declining 
population remained consistent throughout much of the 1980s through to 
the late 2000s, even as negative ground sentiments towards the 
unprecedented and unanticipated influx of foreigners became more 
pronounced. Immigration policy was still very much business-centric and 
driven by the growing economy, with the government being very concerned 
with the global competition for talent. A manifest initiative was Contact 
Singapore, which was set up in July 1997 under the Ministry of Manpower, 
which has centres in major cities to promote Singapore “as a good place to 
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work, live and study in, and a gateway to the booming economies of Asia”, to 
both foreigners and overseas Singaporeans who are highly skilled.264 In 2008, 
a new Contact Singapore was launched. This time the EDB joined MOM in 
running the programme to attract “entrepreneurs and high net worth 
individuals who could potentially invest and do business in Singapore,” on top 
of the previous target groups.265 
 
There are a few policy fields under the immigration policy and they are 
closely interconnected, though labour migration makes up a huge proportion 
of all immigration to Singapore, as prioritised by the government. Highly 
skilled foreigners at the specialist, managerial, or executive levels can apply 
for the Employment Pass (EP) through their employers, with higher earners 
eligible for the Personalised Employment Pass (PEP) which allows more 
flexibility for job changes, while entrepreneurs can apply for the Entrepass. A 
fixed monthly salary above a certain threshold and relevant qualifications are 
key criteria to meet because the government takes them as the best 
estimation of a foreigner’s quality and economic contribution.266  Foreigners 
on these passes could apply for permanent residency after 2 years without 
much difficulty until recent years. 
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Even though the terms ‘foreign talents’ and ‘foreign workers’ were 
commonly used in government and public discourse, the reality was more 
than what this dichotomy of foreigners captured because the immigration 
policy became more open with the introduction of the S Pass in 2004 for mid-
skilled foreigners to work and stay in Singapore.267 However, there is a quota 
and levy for employers to adhere to which is eased by the government in 
times of labour shortages.268 A fixed monthly salary and relevant 
qualifications and work experience need to be met. Work permit holders, or 
popularly labelled ‘foreign workers’, are made up of a range of semi- or low-
skilled workers in various sectors such as construction, manufacturing, 
marine, services, domestic help, and performing artistes.269 The eligibility 
criteria are undemanding, though work permit holders have fewer 
entitlements than other categories of passes, such as bringing family 
members along, and with more requirements to fulfil on the part of the 
employer.  
 
In contrast to Japan, foreigners are welcome to settle permanently, as long as 
they (or their Singaporean spouses, or parents, or adult children) are 
financially stable and contribute to Singapore’s economy. There is a lack of 
transparency with regard to how permanent residence and citizenship 
applications are assessed since precise reasons are not given when they are 
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turned down.270 The authorities argued that this was to ensure that 
unscrupulous foreigners cannot game the system, though it does provide the 
authorities a lot of flexibility, and hence openness, with regard to permanent 
immigration. A permanent resident can apply for citizenship after two years, 
and is allowed to be absent for up to 12 months during that two-year period. 
Citizenship laws were also relaxed in 2004 for the first time since the 1960s to 
take into account how much the world has changed since then and also 
subsequently, people’s aspirations.271 For instance, an overseas-born child 
can now gain citizenship by descent as long as either of the parents is a 
Singaporean citizen, as opposed to before the change when only fathers 
could pass on the citizenship. 
 
Over the years there have undoubtedly been some changes to the 
immigration policy to make it easier for employers to hire foreigners, among 
whom some would stay on permanently given the privileges accorded to 
them. These changes nonetheless continue to reflect the coherence of the 
immigration policies that are anchored in economic and demographic 
imperatives, with the discourses of ‘immigrant nation’, ‘embracing diversity’, 
‘global competition for talent’, among others, increasingly used to persuade 
the populace to accept the huge inflows of foreigners from various parts of 
the world. Japan’s situation has also been cited quite often as a cautionary 
tale of the dangers of a closed-door immigration policy. Former PM Lee Kuan 
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Yew said to a forum of 600 business professionals that a nation needed 
young people and migrants, without whom it would “just dissolve into 
nothingness”, citing Japan as an example which refused migrants.272 In 
consequence, Singapore’s growth of non-resident and resident populations 
have accelerated rapidly until a few years ago, when the state had to take 
various measures to slow down the influx of foreigners due to changes that 
challenged state dominance in the arena of immigration policy.  
 
5.2 Increasing incoherence: evidences of shift in immigration policy 
The earlier government discourses portrayed a consistency with regard to 
economic and demographic imperatives, and the actions that the 
government and its agencies took to achieve those ends, which was an open 
immigration policy. However, since 2009, while the government continued 
bringing in foreigners to work and settle in Singapore, though at a slower 
rate, its discourse took on a noticeably different tone. At first, the 
government began to strengthen its rhetoric as more dissenting voices from 
the ground were being heard. The then DPM and Home Affairs Minister 
Wong Kan Seng, chairing the National Population Committee, during a 
parliamentary debate affirmed that “immigration remains a key strategy to 
tackle the population challenge”, highlighting that the main question should 
not be how many immigrants Singapore should bring in, but whether enough 
immigrants would be attracted to come especially as their own countries 
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begin to develop.273 He maintained this stance through to 2009, attempting 
to bring attention away from the numbers game which had become a 
sensitive issue, towards the vulnerabilities that Singapore would increasingly 
face as global competition for talent became more intense.274 Emphasis was 
also placed on bringing in “good quality” immigrants who can integrate well 
into society, rather than on quantity.275 
 
However, later on, as immigration policy started becoming less open, PM Lee 
publicly recognised that immigration would be more paced out, and more 
attention would be given to integration given the large influx of foreigners in 
the last few years, admitting that the rate of immigration was “not 
indefinitely sustainable” particularly with regard to societal integration.276 
“Singaporeans first” then became a catchphrase, with the distinction 
between citizens, PRs and non-residents to become clearer as domestic 
policies in education, housing, healthcare and jobs were amended.277 
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At the general level, the immigration tightening measures were “phased in” 
from July 2010, incrementally.278 Two rounds of policy tightening took place 
after the 2011 General Elections for foreign workers at all levels.279 The policy 
for skilled and low-skilled workers were however not being restricted equally. 
Faced with the pressure of avoiding further increments in the proportion of 
foreigners in the workforce and overall population, skilled foreigners who 
would bring more benefit in terms of human capital than unskilled workers 
who would depress wages would be the more prudent choice to give priority 
to. 
 
As part of tightening the immigration policy, the eligibility criterion of 
qualifying salaries for the EP and S Pass were raised from July 2011. For the 
EP, the increase was between $300 to $1000, depending on the specific 
subcategories.280 For the S Pass, the fixed monthly salary was increased from 
$1,800 to $2,000, with the other requirements tightened across all sectors, 
and levies to be paid by employers increased to disincentivise employers 
from hiring mid-skilled foreigners unless they had to.281 These minimum 
salaries to hire foreigners in the high- to mid- skilled areas were raised with 
the aim of ensuring that Singaporeans are fairly considered for jobs without 
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bias towards ‘foreign talents’, or their wages being depressed by the lower 
wages foreigners might be willing to work for. In announcing these measures, 
the Manpower minister made clear that he was not advocating for a 
‘Singaporean-first’ or ‘Singaporean-only’ system because either would be 
detrimental to Singaporeans in the long term, though this stance differed 
from the pronouncement that PM Lee made in 2011.282 The latter could be 
attributed to the urgent need to regain some of the lost confidence in the 
PAP as it witnessed its worst General Election vote share since independence. 
The number of work permits given out each year has also been reduced, with 
Dependency Ratio Ceiling (DRC) reductions to reduce the number of 
foreigners   vis-à-vis a company’s local workforce, and higher levies to be paid 
by employers for certain sectors. These restrictions were felt most acutely by 
small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), therefore the period of 
employment for work permit holders was later extended in 2012 from six to 
ten years by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) after constant engagement 
with the SMEs.283 This extension signalled the increasing incoherence of the 
policies because it is a reflection of how the government was trying to 
balance different demands from societal actors by restricting the number of 
foreign workers but compensated by making their status more secure.   
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Eligibility and rights for permanent residency were tightened as the number 
of PRs given was cut in 2009 onwards.284 PR numbers had grown 
incrementally every year since 2002 as there were no pre-set quotas, until it 
peaked in 2008 with 79,167 PRs granted, an unprecedented number.285 A 
Population White Paper released in 2013, despite the negative reactions it 
drew from various societal actors, proposed to institute an annual quota 
much lower than the numbers seen over the years for PRs and new citizens. 
Stricter eligibility criteria include higher minimum incomes and residential 
requirements, with less security of status as renewals are shortened from the 
five or ten years previously granted. Other schemes tied to the PR policy 
were also affected. For instance, the criteria to gain permanent residency 
through the Global Investor Programme was considerably increased in 2010 
in terms of the amount of turnover funds and local investment efforts that 
foreign entrepreneurs needed to meet.286 Even though it may be argued that 
the tightening of the financial criteria was only a small change in the grand 
scheme of things, it is nonetheless a significant political signal because the 
government was willing to risk the fact that Singapore might find very few 
investors who could meet the more stringent criteria. 
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As opposed to earlier years when the reliance on foreign manpower was 
clearly stated in the visions and aims of the Ministry of Manpower: 
“Singapore has always leveraged on foreign manpower at all levels to 
enhance our economic growth. The employment of foreign manpower is [a] 
deliberate strategy to enable us to grow beyond what our indigenous 
resources can produce”287, the current vision and mission is much more 
toned down and refocused on the ‘Singaporean core’:  
  
Our vision is to develop a great workforce where Singaporeans can aspire to 
higher incomes and fulfilling careers….To achieve this vision, our mission is 
to improve the skills and productivity of the Singaporean workforce so that 
they can have better jobs, higher incomes and a secure retirement. We will 
judiciously supplement our workforce with foreigners to strengthen the 
Singaporean core.288 
 
As reports and international feedback make it clear that Singapore’s 
immigration policy has become more restrictive particularly in some aspects 
and that recommendations have been made to ease these restrictions in 
order to avoid “going into decline”, it is noteworthy that the government has 
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kept the latest immigration policy in place.289 The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) recommended the government to ease its tightened immigration policy 
of recent years because “efforts to incentivize family formation and boost 
productivity among businesses have proven disappointing”, and continuing a 
restrictive policy “will hurt business efficiency, as well as Singapore’s 
competitiveness and reputation for openness”.290 The Manpower minister’s 
answer to a parliamentary question on the impact of restrictions on hiring of 
foreign workers showed that the government has become aware that “the 
voracious appetite for foreign workers had begun to cause a strain on our 
infrastructure and had an impact on how society viewed these 
developments”.291  While employers have pleaded for the restrictions to be 
eased, he highlighted that labour, especially cheap labour, is not a 
sustainable source of productivity for a city-state like Singapore. Various 
schemes have been implemented to assist businesses, especially the SMEs 
which make up the bulk of enterprises, to deal with the shortage of labour as 
the economy is being restructured. 
 
5.3 Shifts in immigration policy arena: change in state-society 
relations  
If we looked closely at the range of tightening measures and the 
accompanying changes in domestic policies beyond their economic 
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substance, like raising salary ceilings or making it more expensive for non-
Singaporeans to access public goods, we find that while the issue framing of 
foreigners as a much needed workforce and population boost remains largely 
intact, there has been a change in the concentration of interests and policy 
targeting.292 This has certainly led to a less coherent immigration policy, as 
the state has had to address growing dissent and a variety of societal actors 
coming forth to challenge the domination of the state in the arena. I argue 
that while demographic and economic imperatives, as framed by the state 
and its agencies, may continue to be valid arguments for an open 
immigration policy, the shift in state-society relations in the arena can help us 
understand why Singapore’s immigration policy has instead taken on a more 
restrictive nature.  
 
Breakdown in image of the state as the unitary, legitimate actor 
Immigration policies prior to the late 2000s were fairly coherent in its open 
nature because the PAP government, with support from its agencies and big 
businesses such as multinational corporations, dominated the policymaking 
arena. This collaboration was strengthened by the fact that the general public 
and societal actors such as opposition parties did not present much challenge 
to the state-driven policies, and civil society groups that were present were 
mostly focused on service provision, not so much on promoting alternative 
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policies.293 The image and practice of a strong state was upheld by the 
growth that the developmental state had been able to deliver and hence its 
legitimacy remained high, at least until 2008.294 
 
The performance legitimacy of the state started  becoming questionable as 
Singaporeans began asking how the immigration policy in pursuit of 
demographic and economic goals was really benefitting them directly, in light 
of statistics which portrayed Singapore as one of the wealthiest nations in the 
world yet at the same time with a high Gini coefficient which reflected 
widening economic inequality.295The rising cost of living, frequency of 
breakdowns in transportation, and general overcrowding were not lost on 
the average Singaporean as negative effects of an open-door policy. The 
SMRT bus drivers’ two-day illegal strike in December 2012 by Chinese 
nationals and the Little India riot in December 2013, as complex as the causes 
of events were more than issues of ‘law and order’ under the government’s 
narrative, from the public’s point of view might be easy to surmise as the 
state having gone overboard with the immigration policy and being somehow 
underprepared for the influx of migrants and its impact.296 
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This breakdown in the image of the state becomes more evident in the 
outcome of the 2011 General Elections, which was the worst election result 
for the ruling party since independence, with a vote share of 61%. In the 
aftermath of the May 7 elections, the party chairman acknowledged that 
there was a “perceived disconnect between the PAP and voters” beyond the 
government policies that “did not work out as well as intended”.297 Further, a 
party member and a parliamentarian who is known for being outspoken, 
Inderjit Singh, expressed that the PAP had been mistaken in calling for early 
elections as it had misinterpreted the ground sentiment. This vote of ‘doubt’ 
against the PAP government was reinforced in two subsequent by-elections 
in Hougang (2012) and Punggol-East (2013) which saw the single member 
constituency seats go to opposition candidates from the Worker’s Party (WP). 
 
The Population White Paper fiasco was the latest notable event which 
showed how the state’s credibility as the unitary legitimate actor in the arena 
of immigration policy had been tarnished. The paper, released in January 
2013 by the National Population and Talent Division, was the government’s 
“roadmap for maintaining economic dynamism, national identity, and a high 
quality of life in the face of rapid population ageing and potential decline”.298 
It proposed a 3-pronged approach, one of which was immigration “for work 
and settlement, albeit at a more measured pace than has been the case in 
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recent years, and better integration of newcomers”299, a point that should 
have been strongly emphasised, judging by the public backlash which was 
mostly focused on the 6.9 million population upper-end projection. The 
reactions from society were hugely negative not only due to the substantial 
increase in projected population at a time when the influx of migrants of 
previous years was still being felt. It was also because the government had 
earlier sought feedback on demographic issues but it did not seem like the 
feedback was taken seriously in the White Paper, though arguably the major 
issue here was miscommunication of intentions.300 
 
Diminishing the state’s domination in the arena – strategies of 
societal actors  
The decline in the state’s image as the sole rulemaker has spurred various 
societal actors into challenging the state’s dominance in the arena through a 
variety of strategies, given the various restrictions put in place for the 
conduct of political activities. I argue that, similar to Japan’s case, the first 
dimension along which they have extended their influence is to take over an 
increasing number of issue areas in the arena. They do so not only by 
critiquing the state’s immigration and related policies, but also coming up 
with alternatives. Some societal actors do not only challenge the state on its 
policies, but also do groundwork in terms of providing services and help to 
vulnerable groups, be they locals or foreigners. In doing so, in ‘walking the 
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talk’, these societal actors inevitably also extend their influence through a 
second dimension – incorporating a larger share of the population’s support.  
 
The National Solidarity Party (NSP) was one of the first opposition parties to 
publicly challenge the open-door immigration policy of the government in the 
2000s, which it charged as being a “quick medicine” to population and talent 
growth while no safeguards were put in place for the most vulnerable in 
society whose price of labour was being pushed down.301  This sentiment was 
echoed by a civil society activist I interviewed who argued that as much as 
there were not many Singaporeans who would like to work in the service 
sector, especially in F&B, the hiring of foreign workers who accept lower pay 
would crowd out the locals who need or would like to do the job. Hence, 
there is need for minimum wage as a sort of guarantee.302 He also pointed 
out the irony of having a salary requirement for EP and S-Pass holders is that 
it ensures by design that foreigners have a minimum wage, something which 
the government does not institute for its own workers. Accentuating the 
issue of wages of foreigners and how they affect Singaporeans, societal 
actors challenge the state’s position on an open immigration policy that was 
having effects that have been neglected.  
 
The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), a well-known opposition party in 
Singapore espousing liberal democratic ideals, questioned why a 
                                                     
301
“NSP wants foreign talent quota, minimum wage,” The Straits Times, August 23, 2006. 
302
 Interview conducted in May 2015.  
116 
 
fundamental premise of the open immigration policy, labour shortage, 
existed.303 One of the main issues raised was that certain jobs have such low 
pay to sustain a livelihood, let alone a family, that locals avoid them and 
hence the need for minimum wage legislation, SDP argued. It also proposed 
taking a new approach, which it contended was sorely lacking in the 
government’s White Paper that was entrenched in the same policy 
fundamentals that led to the current situation.304 The approach focuses on 
controlling immigration through ensuring thorough assessment of all 
potential foreign workers and includes developing an indicator to periodically 
measure the well-being of Singapore beyond the common usage of the gross 
domestic product (GDP).  
 
The Worker’s Party (WP), the only opposition party with elected 
representatives in parliament currently, also raised a number of issue areas 
that the open-door immigration policy has affected, and campaigned on 
these issues during the two by-elections in 2012 and 2013 which it won. It 
took the government to task for the many problems the immigration policy 
has led to: “high housing prices, frequent MRT breakdowns and a lack of 
open spaces”, as well as Singapore “losing its sense of identity”.305 WP also 
published an alternative to the Population White Paper, A Dynamic Singapore 
for a Sustainable Population, a deliberate play on words from the original, A 
Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore, to underscore its proposal’s 
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priority on searching for solutions within Singapore to meet demographic 
challenges and attain economic growth, rather than relying on immigration 
which has anchored much of the government’s approach.306 WP’s leader and 
a member of parliament Low Thia Khiang highlighted how the Marriage and 
Parenthood package which was not effective in encouraging married couples 
to have more babies was being proposed again, emphasising that the 
government’s plan was flawed because it had no clear targets to reach.307 
Immigration would then most likely be the solution sought yet again, but Low 
argued that it would not solve the real problem which was the inconducive 
environment for family life.  
 
Other than opposition parties which posed a direct challenge to the 
government, the other major societal actors that have stepped forward to 
expand their influence in the arena are civil society organisations (CSOs), 
which include formal groups like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
informal groups that coalesce around a cause. These societal actors have 
varying approaches, depending on how long they have been engaging with 
the government and its agencies, and what they think is the most effective 
way of influencing the government. A civil society activist from a non-profit 
organisation which helps Singaporeans who are unemployed through 
coaching, counselling, and small acts of charity, and organises protests on 
major issues that concern Singaporeans, said this of their approach: “I think 
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we want to protest, advocate, but I think we want to be seen as helping”, by 
both the government and the general public.308 Another representative from 
an NGO which advocates for migrants’ rights and fair labour policies 
articulated that they pursue a number of approaches. They make proposals 
to the government and try to engage them in a dialogue, mainly through the 
Ministry of Manpower, and these proposals raise specific issues, informed 
and grounded by research and casework with foreign workers.309 They also 
use various channels to secure change, such as their website, the media, and 
educational talks, as they believe that “the more you get sectors of the public 
on your side and feeling strongly about issues, the more the government will 
entertain your position.” The next strategy that they plan to pursue more 
seriously is engaging the members of parliament because they are important 
actors in the state. The NGO representative felt that if they could be roped in, 
the arena of immigration policy could be more decentralised. Both societal 
actors see the importance of pursuing different but complementary 
approaches and getting as many people as possible supporting their 
positions, as it is a strategy in diminishing the state’s dominance in the arena.  
 
Incorporating a larger share of the population, be they advocates or the 
general public, is the second dimension in which social forces have expanded 
their influence. The 2013 Population White Paper protest was the biggest 
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protest rally seen against government policies since independence.310 
Estimates put the crowd at the Speaker’s Corner in Hong Lim Park at 4000-
strong, a turnout that the organisers did not expect. The event was organised 
independently by transitioning.org but other CSOs were invited, and the 
speakers were diverse individuals, some formerly from the civil service while 
others from opposition parties. The protest was a strong reflection of ground 
sentiments which have swelled, and to have such a large group of members 
of the public show up signalled the strengthening of other social forces in the 
arena that could not be easily ignored. A quote from one of the protest 
organisers sums up the changing public sentiment about the government’s 
approach in the arena of immigration policy:  
 
“No thousands of people would gather to go against a policy, ‘cos that is not 
Singaporean. We are always very law-abiding, very obedient, very okay with 
what the government does. But I think when thousands come out together, 
we want the government to know that we are not happy, and we want you 
[the government] to listen.” 
 
Surveys conducted throughout the 2000s showed that indeed there has been 
a shift in public opinion with regard to the presence of foreigners. In March 
1999, a survey by The Straits Times indicated “*m+ost Singaporeans believe 
the government should bring foreign talent into the labour market despite 
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current economic difficulties faced by the nation.”311 Singaporeans, by and 
large then, did not oppose the immigration of foreigners that the 
government had started welcoming in the 1980s. Slightly more than a decade 
later, an Our Singapore Conversation survey in 2013 found that “more 
Singaporeans prefer reducing the inflow of foreigners even if it translated to 
slower growth and jobs”, a stark difference in public opinion from before, 
which shows that the government’s dominant discourse on the importance 
of keeping an open immigration policy, at least on the economic front, is 
losing its traction.312 And in perhaps one of the most accurate barometer of 
public sentiment, the ruling PAP suffered its worst defeat in the 2011 General 
Elections, with its vote share falling from 66.6% in 2006 to 60.1% in 2011, 
with “the decline being attributed in large part to dissatisfaction over its 
immigration approach.”313 In his 2012 National Day Rally speech, prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong had to address the “rising trend of bad behaviour” 
during his National Day Rally speech, which included anti-foreigner 
sentiments online, which he said would damage Singapore’s reputation as 
“people think that Singapore is anti-foreigner and xenophobic”.314  On one 
hand, it has been argued that this way of reacting indicated that some 
Singaporeans no longer see the rationale of getting the government to 
improve the situation or trust that it would. On the other hand, some 
academics have cautioned against using the term ‘xenophobic’ too loosely as 
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it might obscure the real context of why Singaporeans feel strongly about 
immigration.315 This episode nonetheless illustrates that public sentiments 
inevitably contribute to the state’s diminishing dominance in the arena.  
 
5.4 Incorporation of social forces by the state  
An indication that other social forces have been successful in their efforts at 
expanding their influence in the immigration policy arena is the state’s 
serious considerations of their expressed sentiments and proposals with 
subsequent modifications to its policies and stance towards immigration. 
These changes have led to an increasing incoherence in its immigration 
policies because while the state alters some aspects, it has not completely 
refurbished its immigration stance. Nonetheless this shift is significant 
because it shows that the pattern of state-society relations, at least in the 
immigration policy arena, is moving away from integrated domination, and 
society is not as weak as it used to be as societal actors have become more 
influential such that the state can no longer be the sole rulemaker, with parts 
of it changing to accommodate new circumstances. 
 
Businesses are one of the state’s most important allies in its drive for 
economic prosperity. However, due to the different pulls of societal actors 
upon the state, it realised that it had to change its current high-growth 
labour-driven economic strategy to a productivity-driven growth and having a 
slower intake of the foreign workforce, which hurt businesses, particularly 
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SMEs which make up 99% of enterprises, and contribute to about 45% of 
GDP and 70% of employment in Singapore.316 The government’s discourse is 
now for businesses to improve their productivity and “wean off from a free 
flowing labour market”.317 The government has since been very careful about 
backtracking on its tightening policy despite the short-term economic 
imperative, taking the sentiments of voters and other societal actors into 
serious account.  
 
Along with increasing immigration restrictions, on the domestic side, the 
government has introduced a few measures to manage some of the 
conditions that have led to the swelling of ground sentiments. The Fair 
Consideration Framework (FCF) introduced in 2014 “requires firms to prove 
that they have tried to hire Singaporeans first, by posting job ads for 14 days 
at the National Jobs bank. If they cannot find a suitable Singaporean 
candidate, only then, can they hire a foreigner on Employment Pass”.318 This 
framework is in place to ensure that firms make the effort to look for local 
candidates first before they ascertain that there is a need to look beyond the 
shores. The Minister of Manpower had also emphasised that the government 
was not going to relax its immigration policy, especially on foreign workers, 
even as some sectors have appealed for more lenient quotas, because 
Singapore has reached a point where foreign labour is coming close to half of 
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its resident’s. More public consultations, forums, and dialogue sessions have 
also been carried out, with a wider audience than just key stakeholders and 
government agencies to include youths as well.319 
 
Another important aspect of the state’s incorporation of social forces is the 
open admission that the government does collaborate with NGO partners on 
various things such as handling mistreatment of migrant workers320 and takes 
NGO recommendations for better labour policies seriously. According to an 
interviewee from a local NGO, this is in contrast to previous years when 
NGOs were largely outside the policy arena and their efforts would not be 
acknowledged even if their expertise and on-the ground knowledge was 
sought in closed-door discussions.321 For instance, with regard to the labour 
rights for the foreign workers, there has been improvement due to the 
Ministry of Manpower being more interventionist, though this has taken a 
long time because changes were always piecemeal, rather than coming out of 
a conscious relooking at the situation. A representative from an NGO 
advocating for equitable treatment of migrant workers expressed that some 
of the changes that have taken place were largely because of NGO action, but 
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admitted that “governments, not just the Singapore government, are 
reluctant to admit to responding to NGO pressures”.322 This makes political 
sense in a given situation when there is political mileage to be gained from 
taking credit if policies had to be amended anyway, especially when the 
image of a strong state needed to be upheld. Therefore to have the Ministry 
of Manpower as a state part make it known publicly in recent years that it 
has been working with NGOs on foreign labour issues and acknowledging 
their contributions, it signalled changing state-society relations, at least in the 
arena of immigration policy.323 
 
There has been increased attention on integration efforts as the government 
realised that this issue area was something that was largely neglected but 
could prove to be a potent force for securing a much needed “political buy-
in”, given how the open-door policies had led to a loss of confidence in the 
government over the years.324 The National Integration Council was formed 
in 2009 to promote and support integration efforts at the ground level 
between Singaporeans and new immigrants, and the Singapore Citizenship 
Journey was introduced in 2010 as a 3-part compulsory programme for new 
citizens as part of the requirements to fulfil before they can be granted 
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citizenship documents.325 The programme is to acquaint new citizens with 
Singapore’s history and development while having the opportunity to 
interact with the local community through sharing sessions. While the 
effectiveness of these efforts remains to be seen since integration takes time, 
if better cohesion can be forged between new residents and the populace, 
perhaps Singaporeans would be able to accept the foreigners that are already 
living in their midst better. However, it is not only about integration efforts 
with foreigners or new residents as the focal point. There is also the other 
aspect of ensuring that “Singaporean citizens are not made to feel inferior or 
that they are being taken for granted”, especially with labels like “foreign 
talent” prevalent in the issue framing of the state’s immigration policy.326 The 
other important issue would be addressing and managing expectations of 
how integration would look like in an ethnically diverse state like Singapore 
with a certain multicultural approach, especially with unanticipated social 
tensions arising from ethnicity and nationality differences.327 If lessons from 
the state-driven open immigration policy and the resulting change in the 
pattern of domination are anything to go by, integration efforts would do 
well to genuinely incorporate societal actors in decision making.  
 
5.5 Concluding assessment  
Singapore’s open immigration policies from 1980s onward earned it the title 
of ‘Singapore Inc.’ by some quarters because of the strong economic and 
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business logics that drove the policies, and also the way Singapore was being 
run like a corporation by the state and its agencies which have integrated 
domination over society. However in recent years, there has been a shift in 
the immigration policy, resulting in an increase in restrictiveness of the policy 
fields, though not equally across the board. This is surprising because the 
same economic conditions that led to and sustained the influx of foreigners 
have largely remained, and it does not seem like Singapore’s demographic 
challenge is going to be resolved any time soon with the current low 
birthrates. I have argued that this increasing incoherence in immigration 
policy can be attributed to a change in state-society relations, at least in the 
arena of immigration policy, due to a breakdown in image of the state as the 
unitary and legitimate actor. This has largely been caused by the negative 
effects of the open immigration policy on the physical and social 
environment, and the questions raised over the performance legitimacy of 
the PAP government by various social forces. Following this breakdown in 
image, the strategies of some social forces to expand their influence in the 
arena through taking over more issue areas and integrating a larger share of 
the population have challenged the state’s domination in the arena, resulting 
in the latter realising the need to incorporate and accommodate these forces. 










6.1 Summary of theoretical framework and case study findings  
This thesis set out to explain why the immigration policies of some states are 
coherent while others’ are incoherent. I have argued that the nature of state-
society relations matters in explaining the coherence of a state’s immigration 
policy. When there is an integrated domination by an actor or a coalition of 
actors, the resulting policy is either coherently restrictive or open, depending 
on the actors who dominate. When there is a dispersed domination in which 
different actors hold very different views about immigration, the resulting 
policy is incoherent, with a mixture of restrictive and more open 
components.  
 
Within a strong state where the state and its agencies have integrated 
domination over the arena, I have argued that a shift in coherence occurs 
when these elements in the state-society relations change: a breakdown in 
the image of the state as the unitary and legitimate actor with the sole 
policymaking discretion and discursive power, a subsequent change in 
configuration of social forces in the arena who expand their influence 
through various strategies, leading to the state’s incorporation of these social 
forces which results in varying changes to the immigration policy stance, 
hence affecting its coherence. Effectively, the shift in coherence that occurs is 
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a manifestation of the movement away from an integrated domination of the 
state, at least in the arena of immigration policy.  
 
In Chapter 4, I put forth that Japan’s coherently restrictive immigration policy 
from the 1990s to the mid-2000s became less coherent in the late-2000s as 
less restrictive elements were introduced due to a change in state-society 
relations. First, the image of a strong state in control of its immigration policy 
was delinked from the reality of side-door entry of immigrants without 
proper national policies to manage them. Second, this led to a decline in 
state autonomy over immigration policy as other social forces organised and 
expanded their influence through welfare and service provision, and 
advocacy, challenging state narratives and affecting public opinion. The 
state’s incorporation of these social forces by considering them seriously and 
modifying its policies signifies the diminishing dominance of the state in the 
arena of immigration policy.  
 
In Chapter 5, I put forth that Singapore’s coherently open immigration policy 
from the 1980s to 2008 became less coherent in the late-2000s as restrictive 
elements were introduced. This was due to first, the image of a strong state 
which knew what it was doing with the immigration policy was delinked from 
the reality that the demographic goals and economic growth were not really 
being achieved and benefitting Singaporeans despite the mass influx of 
foreigners. It made matters worse that at the same time issues such as public 
transport breakdowns, rising cost of living, and general overcrowding were 
129 
 
exacerbated. Second, adding to the decline in state autonomy as public 
opinion worsened, societal actors took the opportunity to expand their 
influence, by directly challenging state policies and providing alternatives, 
which had mounted the share of discontented citizens. The state could not 
ignore these developments and was forced to scale back on its plans, 
gradually and unequally in some policy fields, while instituting other 
measures to respond to the groundswell, effectively illustrating the 
diminishing dominance of the state. 
 
The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights the untenable ‘ethnic 
hypothesis’ which is based upon unchanging and simplistic assumptions of 
societies, especially if the ethnic compositions of those societies have 
changed little since independence. It also challenges the notion that 
homogeneous or heterogeneous populations are predisposed to behave in 
certain ways and whose governments will adopt immigration policies 
accordingly. Both Japan and Singapore were experiencing shifts in the 
coherence of their immigration policies which moved their characterisation 
away from being conventionally restrictive and open, respectively, towards 
the centre. At the heart of this converging pattern lies a similar process taking 
place in both societies where the state-society relations are evolving away 
from an integrated domination of the state in the arena of immigration 
policy, to a growing influence of other social forces. A bigger implication for 
these two strong states would be the significance of winning (or losing) the 
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‘small battles’ in the arenas.328 If other social forces are able to considerably 
weaken the state’s domination in the arena of immigration policy, the state 
has some reason to be concerned as losing some control over immigration 
policymaking could potentially affect its domination in other arenas.  
 
With immigration becoming an important issue in many countries, 
particularly the more developed ones to which many immigrants would be 
attracted to, it is necessary to understand how and why some states have 
been able to enact policies that send a clear signal to potential immigrants, 
while others have policies that do not match their intentions, resulting in 
uncontrolled or illegal immigration. Immigration policies are not necessarily 
open or restrictive by design; prevailing circumstances determine the 
stances. Because immigration policy determines immigration patterns 
considerably and has effects that not only affect migrants but also the 
societies from which they originate and to which they are settling in, it is 
important for states to get their immigration policies right.  
 
This is admittedly a challenging task, and there is no one way of going about 
it. Getting policies right or improving them entails ensuring that they cohere 
as much as possible. This can be done by integrating immigration into 
national planning, and looking at it beyond the usual economic lens or 
material considerations of the destination state. The goals of a coherent 
immigration policy are not a given, and often they are not explicitly discussed 
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among the multiple relevant actors in the arena who should ideally come to 
an agreement about what they are. These could be maximising the outcomes 
of migration as a process by ensuring that the human potential of migrants 
are realised, and by minimising the adverse effects on origin and destination 
countries. 
 
Following from the argument made in this thesis, the coherence of policy is 
dependent upon a condition of state-society relations in which an actor or a 
group of actors, usually the state (and its allies), has integrated domination in 
the arena. The state may or may not be able to maintain its unitary 
policymaking and discursive powers, depending on the type of reactions it 
receives from other social forces in the arena, whether the latter are 
challenging the state or would like to coalesce with the state. To get societal 
actors to coalesce with the state instead of opposing it, the state needs to 
manage its image by ensuring that its rhetoric and practices are matched. In 
some cases, a diminishing dominance of the state which results in a shift in 
policy coherence may not necessarily be inimical to policymaking. It is an 
important process through which other social forces can gain the space to 
pursue their interests, provide alternatives and representation for voices 
which are lacking in the arena (such as migrants who lack basic rights), before 





First, this thesis was an exercise at theory-testing. Quantitative methods are 
usually employed for theory-testing because they increase the support for 
the generalisability of the findings that hold across many cases. However, 
here I have used mostly qualitative methods to test the theory on two 
dissimilar case studies that share a similar outcome of interest (from 
coherent to less coherent immigration policy) to study the state-society 
dynamics behind this outcome. Had I used a quantitative approach, I would 
not have been able to trace the similar process (the diminishing of the state’s 
dominance in the arena) that was taking place in both cases, which was also 
the aim of this thesis. Further, by adopting a most dissimilar research design, 
I believe that it does lend some support to the generalisability of my findings 
since they occur in two cases which are very different on most significant 
dimensions.  
 
Second, I relied substantially on news reports and public opinion surveys to 
support my arguments. Although using public opinion surveys done by 
certain organisations or news agencies with specific purposes or whose 
methodology I cannot fully verify opens up questions about its validity and 
reliability, these are the most easily available data on public sentiments that I 
could utilise. For Singapore’s case, I relied heavily on news reports from the 
mainstream media which is known to be under the close supervision of the 
state and might be slightly biased, while for Japan’s case, even though 
mainstream newspapers are not controlled by the state, I am limited to the 
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English-language newspapers. I have tried to overcome these by using data 
and information from a wider range of sources, such as supplementary semi-
structured interviews for Singapore’s case, news reports from international 
news agencies for both, to bolster the findings.  
 
6.3 Recommendations 
First, future research on the immigration policy and state-society relations 
could expand on cases that vary along the axes used in this thesis, which are 
strong states and ethnic composition, or cases that experience shifts in the 
other direction, that is, from incoherent to more coherent policies. The 
former would strengthen the applicability of the theoretical framework if it 
could explain the shift in coherence for states with different variations on 
these or other characteristics, while the latter would demonstrate that the 
theoretical framework is also sound in reverse situations.  
 
Second, comparative research on immigration policy is widely done on 
western countries but not as much on other parts of the world, especially 
where English is not the medium of instruction. Future research could look 
into gaining language access so that more cases can be selected for study 
with a wider source of data and information to be tapped on, and with less 
concern about meanings possibly lost in translation. While I was only able to 
gain access to materials in English, this thesis was an endeavour in 
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